Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy: A Dialectical Model

2004 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden

The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage ofDA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of denying the antecedent is to shift the burden of proof back to the original proponent of a claim. We provide a model of this non-fallacious usage which is built upon pragmatic models of argumentation.

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-128
Author(s):  
Gastón Robert

This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony (PEH) in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every simple as representational power and of the metaphysics of unity and activity in which that construal is rooted.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

The CSI Effect posits that exposure to television programs that portray forensic science (e.g., CSI: Crime Scene Investigation) can change the way jurors evaluate forensic evidence. The most commonly researched hypothesis under the CSI Effect suggests that shows like CSI depict an unrealistically high standard of forensic science and thus unreasonably inflate the expectations of jurors. Jurors are thus more likely to vote to acquit, and prosecutors face higher burden of proof. We review (1) the theory behind the CSI Effect, (2) the perception of the effect among legal actors, (3) the academic treatment of the effect, and (4) how courts have dealt with the effect. We demonstrate that while legal actors do see the CSI Effect as a serious issue, there is virtually no empirical evidence suggesting it is a real phenomenon. Moreover, many of the remedies employed by courts may do no more than introduce bias into juror decision making or even trigger the CSI Effect when it would not normally occur (i.e., the self-fulfilling prophesy). We end with suggestions for the proper treatment of the CSI Effect in courts, and directions for future scholarly work.


2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-415
Author(s):  
Luke Beck

The argument that led to the inclusion of s 116 of the Constitution, a provision that provides a limited guarantee of religious freedom in Australia, has not been properly understood. The standard account of the argument presented by the proponent of the clause, Henry Bournes Higgins, holds that it was included to ensure that no inferential power to legislate with respect to religion could be drawn from the religious words of the constitutional preamble. This article argues that the standard account of Higgins' argument is wrong and that the substance of Higgins' concern was a realisation that the Commonwealth's enumerated powers were wide enough to authorise legislation dealing with religion.


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