Natural language, sortal reducibility and generalized quantifiers

1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 314-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Keenan
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Strong Form ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Natural Language Semantics ◽  
Language Semantics

AbstractRecent work in natural language semantics leads to some new observations on generalized quantifiers. In §1 we show that English quantifiers of type 〈1, 1〉 are booleanly generated by theirgeneralized universalandgeneralized existentialmembers. These two classes also constitute thesortally reduciblemembers of this type.Section 2 presents our main result — the Generalized Prefix Theorem (GPT). This theorem characterizes the conditions under which formulas of the form (Q1x1…QnxnRx1…xnandq1x1…qnxnRx1…xnare logically equivalent for arbitrary generalized quantifiersQi,qi. GPT generalizes, perhaps in an unexpectedly strong form, the Linear Prefix Theorem (appropriately modified) of Keisler & Walkoe (1973).

scholarly journals VIII—Propositions and Cognitive Relations

2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas K Jones
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Natural Language Semantics ◽  
True Nature ◽  
First Order ◽  
Turn On ◽  
Language Semantics ◽  
Ontological Categories ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Semantic Types

Abstract There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions’ true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.

What is—or, for that Matter, isn’t—‘Experimental’ Semantics?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pauline Jacobson
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Natural Language Semantics ◽  
Empirical Methods ◽  
Language Semantics ◽  
Experimental Semantics

This chapter examines the currently fashionable notion of ‘experimental semantics’, and argues that most work in natural language semantics has always been experimental. The oft-cited dichotomy between ‘theoretical’ (or ‘armchair’) and ‘experimental’ is bogus and should be dropped form the discourse. The same holds for dichotomies like ‘intuition-based’ (or ‘thought experiments’) vs. ‘empirical’ work (and ‘real experiments’). The so-called new ‘empirical’ methods are often nothing more than collecting the large-scale ‘intuitions’ or, doing multiple thought experiments. Of course the use of multiple subjects could well allow for a better experiment than the more traditional single or few subject methodologies. But whether or not this is the case depends entirely on the question at hand. In fact, the chapter considers several multiple-subject studies and shows that the particular methodology in those cases does not necessarily provide important insights, and the chapter argues that some its claimed benefits are incorrect.

A Metalogical Theory of Natural Language Semantics

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-116
Author(s):  
Michael Mccord ◽  
Arendse Bernth
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Natural Language Semantics ◽  
Language Semantics
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