Lethal Military Robots

2019 ◽  
pp. 394-411
Author(s):  
Lambèr Royakkers ◽  
Peter Olsthoorn

Although most unmanned systems that militaries use today are still unarmed and predominantly used for surveillance, it is especially the proliferation of armed military robots that raises some serious ethical questions. One of the most pressing concerns the moral responsibility in case a military robot uses violence in a way that would normally qualify as a war crime. In this chapter, the authors critically assess the chain of responsibility with respect to the deployment of both semi-autonomous and (learning) autonomous lethal military robots. They start by looking at military commanders because they are the ones with whom responsibility normally lies. The authors argue that this is typically still the case when lethal robots kill wrongly – even if these robots act autonomously. Nonetheless, they next look into the possible moral responsibility of the actors at the beginning and the end of the causal chain: those who design and manufacture armed military robots, and those who, far from the battlefield, remotely control them.

Author(s):  
Lambèr Royakkers ◽  
Peter Olsthoorn

Although most unmanned systems that militaries use today are still unarmed and predominantly used for surveillance, it is especially the proliferation of armed military robots that raises some serious ethical questions. One of the most pressing concerns the moral responsibility in case a military robot uses violence in a way that would normally qualify as a war crime. In this chapter, the authors critically assess the chain of responsibility with respect to the deployment of both semi-autonomous and (learning) autonomous lethal military robots. They start by looking at military commanders because they are the ones with whom responsibility normally lies. The authors argue that this is typically still the case when lethal robots kill wrongly – even if these robots act autonomously. Nonetheless, they next look into the possible moral responsibility of the actors at the beginning and the end of the causal chain: those who design and manufacture armed military robots, and those who, far from the battlefield, remotely control them.


2015 ◽  
pp. 2068-2082
Author(s):  
Lambèr Royakkers ◽  
Peter Olsthoorn

Most unmanned systems used in operations today are unarmed and mainly used for reconnaissance and mine clearing, yet the increase of the number of armed military robots is undeniable. The use of these robots raises some serious ethical questions. For instance: who can be held morally responsible in reason when a military robot is involved in an act of violence that would normally be described as a war crime? In this article, The authors critically assess the attribution of responsibility with respect to the deployment of both non-autonomous and non-learning autonomous lethal military robots. The authors will start by looking at the role of those with whom responsibility normally lies, the commanders. The authors argue that this is no different in the case of the above mentioned robots. After that, we will turn to those at the beginning and the end of the causal chain, respectively the manufacturers and designers, and the human operators who remotely control armed military robots from behind a computer screen.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lambèr Royakkers ◽  
Peter Olsthoorn

Most unmanned systems used in operations today are unarmed and mainly used for reconnaissance and mine clearing, yet the increase of the number of armed military robots is undeniable. The use of these robots raises some serious ethical questions. For instance: who can be held morally responsible in reason when a military robot is involved in an act of violence that would normally be described as a war crime? In this article, The authors critically assess the attribution of responsibility with respect to the deployment of both non-autonomous and non-learning autonomous lethal military robots. The authors will start by looking at the role of those with whom responsibility normally lies, the commanders. The authors argue that this is no different in the case of the above mentioned robots. After that, we will turn to those at the beginning and the end of the causal chain, respectively the manufacturers and designers, and the human operators who remotely control armed military robots from behind a computer screen.


1970 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Y S Gowramma

'Freedom and Determinism' is a conflicting postulate with reference to the nature of human conduct. Is man free or is everything determined? Freedom is a matter of choice based on rationality, intelligence and knowledge. Moral freedom implies both choice and responsibility. ­Man is morally good because, he enjoys freedom which makes life meaningful. So, freedom and social responsibility go hand in hand. Determinists argue that free will is impossible and preceding causes necessitate everything. Naturalistic determinists consider man a part of causal chain. His actions are determined by antecedent causes. Hence, man is an 'instrumental cause. Theistic Determinists trace man's actions to God's controlling hand. Hard-determinists believe that determinism is true and moral responsibility is an illusion. So, determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. They interpret freedom as the 'Liberty of indifference.' In the opinion of soft determinists, determinism is true but man can make choices, which are the effects of certain antecedent events. So, freedom and determinism are compatible and interpret freedom as the 'Liberty of Spontaneity'. According to libertarians, determinism is false, freedom is possible and man is morally responsible for his actions. Freedom and determinism, being an ethical problem sometimes seems to deny each other and some other times seem to co-inhere in our life. The paper argues that freedom, however limited it may be, is a 'fact' of experience while, determinism is mostly a matter of 'faith', and whether to accept the fact or the faith, depends on one's individual choice and belief. Both represent different attitudes of man. So, the key is more 'attitudinal' than 'conceptual'.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Rakison ◽  
Gabriel Tobin Smith ◽  
Areej Ali
Keyword(s):  

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