Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules


Author(s):  
Nazzini Renato

This chapter studies the consumer harm test. The consumer harm test asks whether the conduct of the dominant undertaking results in higher prices, lower output, or reduced product innovation. The test is not necessarily the manifestation of a consumer welfare objective of the competition rules but is consistent with the achievement of long-term social welfare. Therefore, the test may be applied under Article 102 even if this provision does not aim at maximizing some measure of consumer welfare but long-term social welfare. The chapter then looks at the consumer harm test in vertical foreclosure, focusing on refusal to supply and margin squeeze. Proof of consumer harm is required in all vertical foreclosure cases and not only when the refusal to supply relates to intellectual property rights.





2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-100
Author(s):  
Masako Wakui

Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules by Prof. Valentine Korah, Hardcover: 322 pages, Publisher: Hart Publishing (16 Feb 2006). ISBN-10: 184113614X



2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-127
Author(s):  
Rolf H Weber

Abstract The reconciliation of intellectual property rights laws with competition rules is a difficult task. For decades, courts and legal doctrine have been trying to draw fine lines in order to balance corresponding (yet partly differing) interests. Recently, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court ruled on the tensions between copyright and competition law, particularly assessing data interfaces in the credit/debit card payment transactions business. The Court applied a restrictive approach in respect of the exclusively protected sphere of the rightholder–its behaviour of building entry barriers for potential competitors was considered non-compliant with the Cartel Act. This contribution outlines the general principles applied in relation to the reconciliation of intellectual property rights with competition rules in the Swiss law environment and analyses the detailed, concrete reasoning of the recent decision in the light of the needs of the growing information society.



2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEITH E. MASKUS

The negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) greatly expands the purview of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into domestic regulatory standards. This evolution immediately raises the question of whether other regulatory standards, including competition policy, environmental standards, and worker rights, should be added to the WTO agenda. Indeed, the Doha Declaration opened the door for negotiations on the environment and competition policy but not labor standards. In this paper I review the logic and evidence for this decision based on economic arguments for multilateral management of market externalities, policy coordination problems, and systemic trade issues. The review concludes that, conditional upon the protection of intellectual property rights in the WTO, a strong case may be made for including competition rules. The case is weaker for environmental regulation (if by that is meant a set of WTO rules on permissible standards) and quite weak for core labor standards.





Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document