scholarly journals Downward Causation and Levels

Keyword(s):  
Paleobiology ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth S. Vrba ◽  
Niles Eldredge

Hierarchy is a central phenomenon of life. Yet it does not feature as such in traditional biological theory. The genealogical hierarchy is a nested organization of entities at ascending levels. There are phenomena common to all levels: (1) Entities such as genomic constituents, organisms, demes, and species are individuals. (2) They have aggregate characters (statistics of characters of subparts), but also emergent characters (arising from organization among subparts). Character variation changes by (3) introduction of novelty and (4) sorting by differential birth and death. Causation of introduction and sorting of variation at each level may be (5) upward from lower levels, (6) downward from higher levels, or (7) lodged at the focal level. The term “selection” applies to only one of the possible processes which cause sorting at a focal level. Neo-Darwinian explanations are too narrow, both in the levels (of genotypes and phenotypes) and in the directive process (selection) which are stressed. The acknowledgment of additional, hierarchical phenomena does not usually extend beyond lip service. We urge that interlevel causation should feature centrally in explanatory hypotheses of evolution. For instance, a ready explanation for divergence in populations is “selection of random mutants.” But upward causation from genome dynamics (or downward causation from the hierarchical organism) to the directed introduction of mutants may be more important in a given case. Similarly, a long-term trend is traditionally explained as additive evolution in populations. But sorting among species may be the cardinal factor, and the cause may not be species selection but upward causation from lower levels. A general theory of biology is a theory of hierarchical levels—how they arise and interact. This is a preliminary contribution mainly to the latter question.


Author(s):  
Paul Humphreys

This chapter surveys contemporary theories of emergence and argues that no comprehensive account currently exists. It separates ontological emergence, epistemological emergence, and conceptual emergence, as well as discussing synchronic and diachronic forms of each. It further argues that the emphasis on emergence in the philosophy of mind has led to a neglect of diachronic emergence and that the contrast between reduction and emergence has reinforced that bias. Downward causation is assessed as being less of a problem for ontological emergence than usually supposed; recent presentations of weak emergence and of undecidability results are discussed. Universality and nonlinearity as sources of emergence are examined, as is the role of holism in emergence and skepticism about the existence of emergence. Finally, a tentative suggestion is made about how to bring order to this vast literature.


2021 ◽  
pp. 148-161
Author(s):  
John Heil

The chapter provides a discussion of hylomorphism, a doctrine associated with Aristotle and his medieval followers according to which objects are compounds of matter and form. Two strands of contemporary hylomorphism are examined, one of which invokes a kind of downward causation. Another ‘modest’ strand regards forms as essences, the what it is to be (what it takes to be) something of a particular kind: a tree, a rabbit, an electron. This leaves open the nature of matter. Aristotle might or might not have embraced ‘prime matter’, but his account of change appears to call for a material something underlying changes among the elemental stuffs. The upshot is a seamless ‘blancmange’ universe apparently inhospitable to motion and to causal interaction among distinct objects.


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