Identify too big to fail banks and capital insurance: An equilibrium approach

The objective of this paper is develop a rational expectation equilibrium model of capital insurance to identify too big to fail banks. The main results of this model include (1) too big to fail banks can be identified explicitly by a systemic risk measure, loss betas, of all banks in the entire financial sector; (2) the too big to fail feature can be largely justified by a high level of loss beta; (3) the capital insurance proposal benefits market participants and reduces the systemic risk; (4) the implicit guarantee subsidy can be estimated endogenously; and lastly, (5) the capital insurance proposal can be used to resolve the moral hazard issue. We implement this model and document that the too big to fail issue has been considerably reduced in the pro-crisis period. As a result, the capital insurance proposal could be a useful macro-regulation innovation policy tool.

Offering Money-Back Guarantees in the Presence of Strategic Consumers

This paper studies the benefits of money-back guarantees (MBGs) on the seller under the presence of strategic consumers. The seller initially can offer the MBGs or no-MBGs in the selling season but may sell the leftover inventory at a salvage price without the MBGs at the end of the season. The strategic consumers choose the purchasing timing based on their expected surplus. The authors compare the models of the MBGs offer to no-MBGs in the selling season. By characterizing the rational expectation equilibrium, they find that the seller can charge a higher price in the case of the MBGs offer compared to no-MBGs. Accordingly, the seller's stocking level is higher and thus the seller's profit has the corresponding result. This result explains why MBGs is ubiquitous in the retailing world. The effects of the parameters in the model on the profit benefit are shown in the numerical analysis.