A-174 Diurnal Preference Relation to Need for Cognition and Cognitive Reflection

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 1229-1229
Author(s):  
Jasmin H Pizer ◽  
Melissa A Myers ◽  
Nanako A Hawley ◽  
Murphy N Harrell ◽  
Benjamin D Hill

Abstract Objective This study evaluated the effect of individual differences in diurnal preferences on a problem-solving test of intelligence and a measure of a personality trait of how much someone enjoys thinking. Method Archival data from 85 participants who had completed measures online were utilized in this study. The sample was 51.8% female, 71.8% Caucasian, and mean age was 19.5. Participants completed the Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ), Composite Morningness Questionnaire (CMQ), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and Need for Cognition Scale-Short Form (NFC). Raw score totals were utilized. Diurnal preferences were later grouped for morning, evening, or in between based on published MEQ and CMQ cutoffs. Lower scores indicate evening types, and higher scores indicate morning types. Results Scores on measures of diurnal preference were significantly positively related to NFC (MEQ r = 0.28, p = 0.011; CMQ r = 0.36, p = 0.001) meaning that morning types tend to enjoy effortful mentation more. Diurnal preferences were not significantly related to CRT performance. One-way ANOVA was performed with diurnal preferences as the group factor and NFC and CRT as dependent variables. Significant main effects were not found for MEQ and NFC nor MEQ and CRT. Significant main effects were found for CMQ and NFC F(2,77) = 5.33, p = 0.007, but not for CMQ and CRT. Conclusion These findings indicate that diurnal preference was not associated with performance on the problem-solving intelligence test used in this study. However, morning types appear to be higher for personality traits related to motivation to engage in thinking and would be expected to do better on some cognitive tests that demand more test engagement.

Author(s):  
Antonio Aquino ◽  
Laura Picconi ◽  
Francesca Romana Alparone

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Širůček ◽  
Adam Ťápal ◽  
Pavla Linhartová

1990 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 321-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugenia Tolentino ◽  
Lisa Curry ◽  
Gary Leak

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene‐Anna N. Diakidoy ◽  
Stelios A. Christodoulou ◽  
Georgios Floros ◽  
Kalypso Iordanou ◽  
Philip V. Kargopoulos

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niraj Patel ◽  
S. Glenn Baker ◽  
Laura Danielle Scherer

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has increasingly dominated theorizing about individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities, and it is associated with many real-world beliefs and judgments, such as religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and moral judgments. The CRT triggers common incorrect responses that come to mind easily, and it is assumed that recognizing this error is tantamount to solving the problems. As a result, incorrect answers on the CRT purportedly indicate an intuitive thought process, whereas correct answers purportedly indicate a reflective thought process. It has also been argued that the CRT problems are fundamentally different from insight problems because insight problems often cause people to sit lost in thought, unable to solve the problem until they correctly reframe it. The present research tested these assumptions and found that a substantial proportion of people have difficulty solving the problems even when the “intuitive” response is unavailable to them, the correct answer is among four multiple-choice options, and they take time to reflect. Associations between the CRT and beliefs (religiosity, paranormal beliefs, moral judgments, etc.) remained even under conditions in which CRT errors appeared to result from more reflective thought than correct responses. Furthermore, multi-dimensional item response theory models indicated that the CRT loaded onto numeracy and insight problem solving ability factors rather than its own unique factor. Additionally, regression analyses indicated that numeracy and insight may account for many associations between the CRT and real-world beliefs. Broader implications for dual-process theories of reasoning and judgment are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 1230-1230
Author(s):  
Nanako A Hawley ◽  
Melissa Myers ◽  
Jasmin Pizer ◽  
Murphy Harrell ◽  
Benjamin D Hill

Abstract Objective This study aimed to examine the effect of personality traits on a simple problem-solving test of intelligence. Method The sample consisted of 82 undergraduates. Participants completed an online battery that included an open source Five Factor Model measure (IPIP FFM), Grit scale, Need for Cognition (NFC) scale, and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). CRT is a simple 3 question test of intelligence. An interaction variable for positive effort was created by multiplying the total raw scores for the Grit and NFC scales (Grit x NFC). Correlations were conducted between the Grit x NFC, IPIP FFM, and the CRT total score. Scales that significantly correlated with CRT total score were entered into a regression model. Results Pearson correlations revealed a significant positive association between Grit x NFC and CRT performance, (r = 0.240, p < 0.05). A significant correlation was also found between IPIP FFM Extraversion factor and CRT performance (r = 0.230, p < 0.05). A regression model found that Grit x NFC and IPIP FFM Extraversion accounted for 9.2% of the variance in CRT total scores, (R2 = 0.092, F(1,82) = 3.92, p = 0.024). When examined individually, no individual predictors were significant. Conclusion These findings suggest that personality traits that reflect positive effort such as Grit and NFC as well as other personality features influence performance on problem-solving bases measures of intelligence. Future research should examine these findings in a larger sample with a broader array of cognitive measures to quantify the role of positive effort in cognitive performance.


1984 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Cacioppo ◽  
Richard E. Petty ◽  
Chuan F. Kao

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