scholarly journals Algumas Notas sobre os Métodos Filosóficos de Ludwig Wittgenstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-183
Author(s):  
Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein

No artigo “Wittgenstein: universalismo, lógica, gramática y lenguaje”, Alejandro Tomasini Bassols afirma que o problema com que Wittgenstein se depara ao fim do Tractatus ”“ as proposições do livro serem elucidações e contrassensos ”“ teve origem em seu erro de considerar a lógica, e não a linguagem, como o mais universal. Bassols afirma ainda que o assim chamado “paradoxo do Tractatus” não foi uma ameaça à segunda filosofia wittgensteiniana porque nela Wittgenstein não cometeu o mesmo erro. Neste artigo argumenta-se que as proposições do Tractatus são contrassensos como consequência direta da teoria pictórica do significado, independentemente da ontologia tractatiana. Além disso, divergindo da opinião de Bassols de ter havido “genuíno progresso filosófico” entre a primeira e a segunda filosofia de Wittgenstein, ressalta-se como o mais sério problema que marca a primeira filosofia wittgensteiniana também marca a segunda: o contrassenso de que Wittgenstein nunca seguiu os próprios métodos filosóficos.

Hard Objects in George Oppen's Discrete Series

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 496-517
Author(s):  
Ned Hercock
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Discrete Series ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
John Ruskin ◽  
Gerard Manley Hopkins ◽  
Marcel Duchamp ◽  
The World ◽  
Production History ◽  
History Of

This essay examines the objects in George Oppen's Discrete Series (1934). It considers their primary property to be their hardness – many of them have distinctively uniform and impenetrable surfaces. This hardness and uniformity is contrasted with 19th century organicism (Gerard Manley Hopkins and John Ruskin). Taking my cue from Kirsten Blythe Painter I show how in their work with hard objects these poems participate within a wider cultural and philosophical turn towards hardness in the early twentieth century (Marcel Duchamp, Adolf Loos, Ludwig Wittgenstein and others). I describe the thinking these poems do with regard to industrialization and to human experience of a resolutely object world – I argue that the presentation of these objects bears witness to the production history of the type of objects which in this era are becoming preponderant in parts of the world. Finally, I suggest that the objects’ impenetrability offers a kind of anti-aesthetic relief: perception without conception. If ‘philosophy recognizes the Concept in everything’ it is still possible, these poems show, to experience resistance to this imperious process of conceptualization. Within thinking objects (poems) these are objects which do not think.

Acerca del supuesto fundamentalismo de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certez

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Basic Beliefs

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM

nr="9"Sprachökonomie und Designökonomie. : Die rhetorische Tradition der Architekturmoderne in Wien

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Detlev Schöttker
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Der Beitrag zeigt, dass die Grundlagen des modernen Bauens und Gestaltens in zentralen Ideen der Rhetorik wie Klarheit, Funktionalität und Ordnung verwurzelt sind. Anders als die Protagonisten und Anhänger des Bauhauses bezogen sich Vertreter der Wiener Moderne auf die Tradition einer rhetorisch fundierten Architekturtheorie seit der Antike, wie an Beiträgen von Adolf Loos, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Josef Frank und Emil Kaufmann erläutert wird.

Concepts of Colour and Limits of Understanding

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Number System ◽  
Colour System ◽  
Perfect Pitch

This chapter examines some puzzling reflections by Ludwig Wittgenstein on the possibility of understanding concepts of the colours of things different from those already familiar to us. It begins with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s statement: ‘Someone who has perfect pitch can learn a language-game that I cannot learn’. In particular, it considers how Wittgenstein draws a connection between perfect pitch and concepts of colours and invites us to imagine people who speak of colours intermediate between red and yellow by means of fractions in a kind of binary notation representing different proportions of the colours at each end of the range from red to yellow. The chapter also analyses Wittgenstein’s views on whether the number system and the colour system ‘reside in our nature or in the nature of things’.

Wittgensteins „General Remarks“

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
Cultural Themes

AbstractDuring the period from 1929 to 1951, Wittgenstein himself marked and collected some distinctive remarks to be found in his Nachlass. A detailed philological and philosophical study shows that this corpus of remarks is divided into two parts. The first runs from 1929 to 1931 and from 1937 to 1938 and consists of those indicated with the sectional marking “O”, while the second runs from 1931 to 1951 and consists of those indicated with the sectional marking “|…|“. The first contains all of the Remarks on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’ corresponding to Part I of the latter and taken from TS211 and MS110 - remarks which appear there in a broader context. And it can also be shown that Part II of the Remarks on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’, taken from MS143, belongs to this same context. The selection and extraction of them all forms a significant and extraordinary corpus with a focus on a broad range of cultural themes.During the period from 1965 to 1966, Georg Henrik von Wright made “A Collection of Remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein”. From this (till now unknown and unpublished) selection, G. H. von Wright then again made a selection. This famous selection from a selection from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass was published - under the title Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture and Value.My article presents and compares these important collections of “General Remarks” and “Cultural Remarks” - that from Ludwig Wittgenstein himself and that made posthumously by Georg Henrik von Wright.

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