The Quietist Posit: A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia

<p>This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”. I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa. I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language.</p>

The Quietist Posit: A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia

<p>This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”. I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa. I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language.</p>

Algumas Notas sobre os Métodos Filosóficos de Ludwig Wittgenstein

No artigo “Wittgenstein: universalismo, lógica, gramática y lenguaje”, Alejandro Tomasini Bassols afirma que o problema com que Wittgenstein se depara ao fim do Tractatus ”“ as proposições do livro serem elucidações e contrassensos ”“ teve origem em seu erro de considerar a lógica, e não a linguagem, como o mais universal. Bassols afirma ainda que o assim chamado “paradoxo do Tractatus” não foi uma ameaça à segunda filosofia wittgensteiniana porque nela Wittgenstein não cometeu o mesmo erro. Neste artigo argumenta-se que as proposições do Tractatus são contrassensos como consequência direta da teoria pictórica do significado, independentemente da ontologia tractatiana. Além disso, divergindo da opinião de Bassols de ter havido “genuíno progresso filosófico” entre a primeira e a segunda filosofia de Wittgenstein, ressalta-se como o mais sério problema que marca a primeira filosofia wittgensteiniana também marca a segunda: o contrassenso de que Wittgenstein nunca seguiu os próprios métodos filosóficos.

Karl R. Popper i Ludwig Wittgenstein jako nauczyciele

Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest mniej znanym faktom z życia dwóch najsłynniejszych filozofów dwudziestowiecznych: Karlowi R. Popperowi i Ludwigowi Wittgensteinowi. Tekst ten dokonuje rekonstrukcji ich praktyki jako nauczycieli i umieszcza ten fakt w kontekście modelu filozofii edukacji przez nich prezentowanych w wybranych dziełach. Doświadczenie nauczycielskie cechuje w obu omawianych przypadkach wiele różnic pod wieloma względami, a różnice te służyć mogą prezentacji ich dzieł koncepcyjnych oraz tego, jak koncepcje te stosowali oni w praktyce. Artykuł ten przywołuje również kontekst reformy szkolnej wprowadzonej w Austrii w latach dwudziestych XX w. i odsłania w jakim stopniu wpłynęła ona na ich koncepcje edukacji i praktyczne jej zastosowanie w szkołach, w których pracowali.

Ludwig Wittgenstein. Itinerario arquitectónico de un filósofo analítico

La condició arquitectònica i les seues connotacions en altres àmbits de la cultura, com el de la filosofia analítica, suposa repte divisible a través de la figura de l’intel·lectual de la Viena del segle XIX, Ludwig Wittgenstein. La seua dedicació obsessiva, tarannà manifest en qualsevol labor que ocupara el seu temps, derivaria, entre altres activitats, en una clara incursió en la professió d’arquitecte. La seua empremta queda exposada en un breu itinerari de la seua obra la qual queda perpetuada a través de la icònica casa Stonborough, construïda per a la seua germana a Viena. En ella culminarà una obra en la qual es testimonia el domini de la proporció espacial interior, la racionalitat i control sobre el detall arquitectònic portat a les seues últimes conseqüències. A partir de l’anàlisi de la seua obra mestra el Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), que al costat de Ser i Temps de Martin Heidegger (1927) constitueixen els dos referents del pensament occidental del passat segle, s’indaga sobre l’exercici que desenvolupa el filòsof, en el context de l’arquitectura, sobre la representació exacta del món mitjançant l’aplicació d’un mètode de lògica deductiva, amb proposicions degudament ordenades amb les quals estructurar el que per a ell constitueix l’esdeveniment essencial del, en aquest cas, “fet” arquitectònic.

imagens do duplo e da mão na obra digital hipertextual 88 Constellations for Wittgenstein (to Be Played with the Left Hand), de DavidClark

O presente artigo visa analisar os percursos temáticos em torno das imagens do duplo e da mão dentro da obra digital hipermídia 88 Constellations for Wittgenstein (to Be Played with the Left Hand), do artista canadense David Clark (2010). Para tanto, o artigo inicialmente procede à apresentação panorâmica do campo da literatura digital e de algumas questões terminológicas da área. Na sequência, apresenta-se uma descrição detalhada da estrutura e do funcionamento do corpus, bem como sua inserção no cânone da literatura eletrônica, antes de passar à análise propriamente dita dos percursos temáticos selecionados. As discussões empreendidas no artigo, por meio de close reading hipertextual, evidenciam a riqueza dessa obra digital e multimodal, que poderia ser lida em variados percursos interpretativos, dos quais destacamos duas rotas interpretativas construídas com base em recorrências temáticas entre fragmentos interconectados sobre vida e obra do filósofo austro-britânico Ludwig Wittgenstein. Além disso, o artigo reflete sobre os desafios para interpretação de uma obra hipertextual digital, ressaltando a importância das escolhas metodológicas para a análise de um objeto cultural com tais especificidades midiáticas e semióticas.

Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

CURRÍCULO ESCOLAR COMO MOBILIZAÇÕES INVENTIVAS E AFETIVAS PELA PRÁTICA DOCENTE

O objetivo deste texto é problematizar práticas curriculares e o fazer docente com base em estudos realizados na disciplina “Inovações Curriculares e Didática”, em um Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação Escolar de uma universidade federal situada no Norte do Brasil. Tem como base teórica estudiosos do campo do currículo, como Veiga-Neto, Ivor Goodson, Marluce Paraíso e Sônia Clareto. Os diálogos ficcionais dos jogos de cenas, inspirados na terapia desconstrucionista de Jacques Derrida (1971) e nos jogos de linguagem de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1999), mostram a potência de práticas docentes curriculares a partir de formas outras que permitam re(pensar) padrões unívocos estabelecidos e consolidados na educação escolar.