A politikai filozófia a világjárványról

Összefoglaló. Ez a filozófiai esszé arra tesz kísérletet, hogy megpróbálja nyomon követni a világjárvány kibontakozását, a változatos védelmi stratégiákat, valamint a mégiscsak bekövetkező tragédiákat a politikai filozófia perspektívájából. Mégpedig valós időben. Az esszé abból a hipotézisből indul ki, hogy az emberiséget váratlanul érte ugyan a járvány, mégis igen gyorsan tudott reagálni (lásd az oltóanyag előállításának gyorsaságát), az egyes emberek azonban nem tudtak kilépni saját természetük korlátai közül. Ennek megfelelően a hatalom ismét elkövette a szokásos hibákat, a lázadók lázadtak, és a politika továbbra is a konfliktusok kezelésének művészete maradt. A politikával foglalkozóknak azonban kincsesbánya ez a korszak a politika természetének elemzéséhez. Summary. This paper, written in the genre of the literary essay, tries to keep track of the birth and development of the pandemic, the various defence strategies and the tragedies that took place anyhow, from the perspective of the discipline of political philosophy. Now political philosophy is not characteristically ready to react promptly to the events of the day. It has got a long term perspective, and therefore has no intention to keep an eye on the headlines of the online news portals. It has got long term debits, which cannot be easily paid back in cash. And yet the claim of the paper is that in fact we are confronted by a state of affairs when political philosophy is obliged to take note of contemporary events. And it has to try to respond to those events almost “real time” or directly. We are aware of 4 million dead, by now, which is an unacceptable number. To tackle states of emergency parliaments are usually ready to offer exceptional measures for government action, even in parliamentary democracies. Yet politicians do not necessarily want to take on board the struggle with the virus – they can easily drop it out from the issues of the day –, claiming that public health should not be politicized. Yet by leaving the stage to let professional experts make the decisions, they give up their chance to unite the camp. Statesmen can only unite their camp behind them, if they make use of the window of opportunity opened by an emergency situation, and if they are able to make use of the phobias and anxieties of everyday people, in the fashionable populist, plebeian manner. The essay analyses two basic relationships influenced by the pandemic. One is claimed to be the intergovernmental, or global scene. Here, the great and developing powers are competing with each other, through the still mostly acceptable international norms of taking advantage of inequality. The other is the inner political scene, where there is a growing distrust between the authorities and the ordinary people, fuelled by restrictions, fake news, and forms either of controlling society by illegal means, or of influencing leaders by indirect means. The last part of the essay presents three major aspects from where one can analyse the happenings: a social, a communicational and an economic perspective on its effects. The essay finishes with some cautionary, sceptical notes on human nature, in order to keep vigilance in emergency situations on the loss of balance, either internal or external, to avoid the major dangers.

Membership Eligibility in a Europe of Parliamentary Democracies, 1962–1969

This chapter uses extensive archival evidence to demonstrate how the membership norm adopted by the community in early 1962—that only parliamentary democracies are eligible for membership—shaped European Economic Community decisions on Spain, Turkey, and Greece in the 1960s. Despite its prior openness to Madrid, the EEC rejected Spain’s quest for association in 1962 after trade union activists and members of the European parliament highlighted the gap between the new norm and the repressiveness of the Spanish regime. Despite deep concerns about the under-developed state of the Turkish economy, the EEC approved an association agreement in 1963 that recognized Turkey’s membership eligibility after the country re-established its democratic institutions. And despite the advanced state of the association agreement with Greece, the EEC froze further developments following that country’s military coup in 1967 and linked further progress to a restoration of democracy in Athens.

The Evolution of EU Membership Norms

This chapter traces the emergence, contestation, and evolution of membership norms within the European Union and its institutional precursors from the 1950s to the present. The genealogy demonstrates that these norms have changed significantly over time, contrary to the assumptions of many scholars and the claims of many EU pronouncements in recent decades. EU norms limited membership to non-Communist states (1957–1961), parliamentary democracies (1962–1969), and liberal democracies (1970–2005), but consensus then broke down and has not been re-established. The chapter thus establishes an empirical basis for investigating in later chapters how prevailing membership norms have shaped the community’s decision-making on the eligibility of particular aspirant and candidate states.

The Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

Theories and Empirical Applications of Legislative Debate

This chapter explores the theoretical mechanisms underpinning the participation of Members of Parliament (MPs) in legislative debates across a wide range of parliaments. It argues that researchers must examine both strategic interactions within political parties and political institutions to develop an understanding of which MPs take the floor and how researchers can use legislative speeches to measure the essential concepts of polarization, intra-party dissent, and representation. The chapter discusses the basic institutional framework that governs debate across parliamentary democracies, provides an overview of an intra-party theory of parliamentary debate, and considers various possible extensions of the theory. Finally, the chapter illustrates how scholars can integrate insights from theories of parliamentary debates and text analysis of parliamentary speeches.

Divide to conquer? Strategic parliamentary opposition and coalition government

Parliamentary elections often result in the formation of a coalition government. While the legislative process allows actors within a coalition government to monitor each other, little attention has focused on how opposition parties respond to coalition government. We argue that opposition parties have incentives to uncover and highlight differences and tensions within the governing coalition. A strategy by the opposition to use legislative tools to uncover policy conflicts and ministerial drift within the coalition increases intra-coalition tensions, potentially generating electoral costs for the governing parties, and potentially even hastening the coalition’s demise. To test our argument, we build and analyse a new dataset of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons covering the 2010–15 coalition. As expected, the main opposition party appears to strategically focus questions towards policy areas that uncover intra-coalition tensions. This research highlights the importance of opposition parties in parliamentary democracies.

Agenda Control and Timing of Bill Initiation: A Temporal Perspective on Coalition Governance in Parliamentary Democracies

Although democratic governance imposes temporal constraints, the timing of government policy making activities such as bill initiation is still poorly understood. This holds especially under coalition governments, in which government bills need to find approval by a partner party in parliament. We propose a dynamic temporal perspective in which ministers do not know whether they face a cooperative or competitive partner at the beginning of a term, but they learn this over time and use their agenda control to time further bill initiation in response. A circular regression analysis using data on more than 25,000 government bills from 11 parliamentary democracies over 30 years supports this temporal perspective, showing that ministers initiate bills later in the term when their previous bills have experienced greater scrutiny. Ministers further delay bill initiation when coalition parties’ incentives to deviate from compromise increase and when they have less power to constrain their bills’ scrutiny.

Snap elections increase political trust: a quasi-experiment from the UK

Snap elections, those triggered by incumbents in advance of their original date in the electoral calendar, are a common feature of parliamentary democracies. In this paper we ask: do snap elections influence citizens' trust in the government? Theoretically, we argue that providing citizens with an additional means of endorsing or rejecting the incumbent - giving voters a chance to ''have their say'' - can be interpreted by citizens as normatively desirable and demonstrative of the incumbents desire to legitimise their agenda by (re)-invigorating their political mandate. Leveraging the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May's, shock announcement of early elections in April 2017 with the fieldwork for the Eurobarometer survey, we demonstrate that the announcement of snap elections has a sizeable and significant positive effect on political trust. These, on average, positive effects, however, mask asymmetric responses among citizens. Whilst eurosceptics and voters on the right of the ideological spectrum - those most inclined to support the incumbent May-led Conservative government - became more trusting, no such changes in trust were observed amongst left-wing or non-eurosceptic respondents. Our study advances the understanding of a relatively understudied yet not uncommon political phenomenon, providing causal evidence that snap elections have implications for political trust.

Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies

One of the most important decisions coalition partners make when forming a government is the division of ministries. Ministerial portfolios provide the party in charge with considerable informational and agenda-setting advantages, which parties can use to shape policies according to their preferences. Oversight mechanisms in parliaments play a central role in mitigating ministerial policy discretion, allowing coalition partners to control each other even though power has been delegated to individual ministers. However, we know relatively little about how such mechanisms influence the agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers of ministers and how much influence minister parties have on policy output relative to the government as a whole in different institutional settings. We fill this gap by analyzing original data on over 2000 important social and economic policy reform measures adopted in nine Western European countries over 20 years, based on a coding of more than 1200 country reports issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We find that parliaments with strong oversight powers constrain the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties but have limited impact on their gatekeeping capacity. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making and democratic accountability.

Professional activists? Party activism among political staffers in parliamentary democracies

Although the position of the party on the ground has been weakened by cartelization, grassroots activists remain an important recruitment pool for political professionals. Based on unique survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and Dutch parties (N = 1009), this article offers an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new supply and demand framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by candidate preferences (supply) and party preferences (demand). The findings demonstrate that most political staffers are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy and communication experts, ministerial staff, and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These findings show that paid staffers do not necessarily widen the gap between parties and activists. They also raise normative questions about internal congruence within parties in coalition governments.