Computing approximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games

Networks ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 380-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Emil Feldmann ◽  
Heiko Röglin ◽  
Berthold Vöcking
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Congestion Games ◽  
Network Congestion ◽  
Approximate Nash Equilibria

scholarly journals How hard is it to find extreme Nash equilibria in network congestion games?

2009 ◽  
Vol 410 (47-49) ◽  
pp. 4989-4999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Gassner ◽  
Johannes Hatzl ◽  
Sven O. Krumke ◽  
Heike Sperber ◽  
Gerhard J. Woeginger
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Congestion Games ◽  
Network Congestion

COMPUTING NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PLAYER RESTRICTED NETWORK CONGESTION GAMES IS $\mathcal{PLS}$-COMPLETE

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1250014
Author(s):  
DOMINIC DUMRAUF ◽  
BURKHARD MONIEN
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Potential Function ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Congestion Games ◽  
Network Congestion ◽  
Directed Networks ◽  
Congestion Game ◽  
Tight Reduction

We determine the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in restricted network congestion games. Restricted network congestion games are network congestion games, where for each player there exits a set of edges which he is not allowed to use. Rosenthal's potential function guarantees the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We show that computing a Nash equilibrium in a restricted network congestion game with two players is [Formula: see text]-complete, using a tight reduction from MAXCUT. The result holds for directed networks and for undirected networks.

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