Recursive Functions and Church’s Thesis

Author(s):  
Yu. I. Manin
1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.R. Shoenfield

§1. The origins of recursion theory. In dedicating a book to Steve Kleene, I referred to him as the person who made recursion theory into a theory. Recursion theory was begun by Kleene's teacher at Princeton, Alonzo Church, who first defined the class of recursive functions; first maintained that this class was the class of computable functions (a claim which has come to be known as Church's Thesis); and first used this fact to solve negatively some classical problems on the existence of algorithms. However, it was Kleene who, in his thesis and in his subsequent attempts to convince himself of Church's Thesis, developed a general theory of the behavior of the recursive functions. He continued to develop this theory and extend it to new situations throughout his mathematical career. Indeed, all of the research which he did had a close relationship to recursive functions.Church's Thesis arose in an accidental way. In his investigations of a system of logic which he had invented, Church became interested in a class of functions which he called the λ-definable functions. Initially, Church knew that the successor function and the addition function were λ-definable, but not much else. During 1932, Kleene gradually showed1 that this class of functions was quite extensive; and these results became an important part of his thesis 1935a (completed in June of 1933).


2020 ◽  
pp. 198-207
Author(s):  
O.I. Provotar ◽  
◽  
O.O. Provotar ◽  

An approach to proving the fundamental results of the theory of recursive functions using specific algorithms is consider. For this, the basic constructions of the algorithm are describing exactly and Church's thesis for more narrow classes of algorithmically computational functions is specified (concretized). Using this approach, the belonging of functions to classes of algorithmically computable is argued by the construction of the corresponding algorithms.


1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan Rand Moschovakis

In 1936 Alonzo Church proposed the following thesis: Every effectively computable number-theoretic function is general recursive. The classical mathematician can easily give examples of nonrecursive functions, e.g. by diagonalizing a list of all general recursive functions. But since no such function has been found which is effectively computable, there is as yet no classical evidence against Church's Thesis.The intuitionistic mathematician, following Brouwer, recognizes at least two notions of function: the free-choice sequence (or ordinary number-theoretic function, thought of as the ever-finite but ever-extendable sequence of its values) and the sharp arrow (or effectively definable function, all of whose values can be specified in advance).


1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 797-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Richman

The modern theory of computability is based on the works of Church, Markov and Turing who, starting from quite different models of computation, arrived at the same class of computable functions. The purpose of this paper is the show how the main results of the Church-Markov-Turing theory of computable functions may quickly be derived and understood without recourse to the largely irrelevant theories of recursive functions, Markov algorithms, or Turing machines. We do this by ignoring the problem of what constitutes a computable function and concentrating on the central feature of the Church-Markov-Turing theory: that the set of computable partial functions can be effectively enumerated. In this manner we are led directly to the heart of the theory of computability without having to fuss about what a computable function is.The spirit of this approach is similar to that of [RGRS]. A major difference is that we operate in the context of constructive mathematics in the sense of Bishop [BSH1], so all functions are computable by definition, and the phrase “you can find” implies “by a finite calculation.” In particular ifPis some property, then the statement “for eachmthere isnsuch thatP(m, n)” means that we can construct a (computable) functionθsuch thatP(m, θ(m))for allm. Church's thesis has a different flavor in an environment like this where the notion of a computable function is primitive.One point of such a treatment of Church's thesis is to make available to Bishopstyle constructivists the Markovian counterexamples of Russian constructivism and recursive function theory. The lack of serious candidates for computable functions other than recursive functions makes it quite implausible that a Bishopstyle constructivist could refute Church's thesis, or any consequence of Church's thesis. Hence counterexamples such as Specker's bounded increasing sequence of rational numbers that is eventually bounded away from any given real number [SPEC] may be used, as Brouwerian counterexamples are, as evidence of the unprovability of certain assertions.


2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 244-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT BLACK

1987 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen C. Kleene

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Putnam

The purpose of this paper is to present two groups of results which have turned out to have a surprisingly close interconnection. The first two results (Theorems 1 and 2) were inspired by the following question: we know what sets are “decidable” — namely, the recursive sets (according to Church's Thesis). But what happens if we modify the notion of a decision procedure by (1) allowing the procedure to “change its mind” any finite number of times (in terms of Turing Machines: we visualize the machine as being given an integer (or an n-tuple of integers) as input. The machine then “prints out” a finite sequence of “yesses” and “nos”. The last “yes” or “no” is always to be the correct answer.); and (2) we give up the requirement that it be possible to tell (effectively) if the computation has terminated? I.e., if the machine has most recently printed “yes”, then we know that the integer put in as input must be in the set unless the machine is going to change its mind; but we have no procedure for telling whether the machine will change its mind or not.The sets for which there exist decision procedures in this widened sense are decidable by “empirical” means — for, if we always “posit” that the most recently generated answer is correct, we will make a finite number of mistakes, but we will eventually get the correct answer. (Note, however, that even if we have gotten to the correct answer (the end of the finite sequence) we are never sure that we have the correct answer.)


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