Tighter Security Proofs for Generic Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

2019 ◽  
pp. 227-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haodong Jiang ◽  
Zhenfeng Zhang ◽  
Zhi Ma
Keyword(s):  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Security Proofs ◽  
Key Encapsulation Mechanism

Tighter Security Proofs for GPV-IBE in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuichi Katsumata ◽  
Shota Yamada ◽  
Takashi Yamakawa
Keyword(s):  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Security Proofs

A Provably Secure E-Cash Scheme with Loss-Tracing

2013 ◽  
Vol 748 ◽  
pp. 958-966
Author(s):  
Bin Lian ◽  
Gong Liang Chen ◽  
Jian Hua Li
Keyword(s):  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trusted Third Party ◽  
Security Proofs ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Practical Scheme ◽  
Provably Secure

E-cash should be spent anonymously in normal circumstances, while in many schemes, the trusted authority is the only one who acts as customer-tracer and e-coin-tracer for preventing illegal transactions, but it is not the case in the reality. In our practical scheme, the bank traces double-spenders without the help of others, and the trusted third party traces e-coins and the owner only when the customer is involved in crimes. When customers lose their e-coins for some reasons, the loss-tracing can be triggered in our scheme which is neglected by almost all existing schemes, so if the lost coins haven't been spent by anyone, the customers can get the refund from the bank. And then the security proofs for our E-cash scheme are provided in the random oracle model.

scholarly journals Secure identity-based encryption in the quantum random oracle model

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Zhandry
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Algorithms ◽  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Security Proofs ◽  
Pseudorandom Functions ◽  
Identity Based Encryption ◽  
Identity Based

We give the first proof of security for an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme in the quantum random oracle model. This is the first proof of security for any scheme in this model that does not rely on the assumed existence of so-called quantum-secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs). Our techniques are quite general and we use them to obtain security proofs for two random oracle hierarchical IBE schemes and a random oracle signature scheme, all of which have previously resisted quantum security proofs, even assuming quantum-secure PRFs. We also explain how to remove quantum-secure PRFs from prior quantum random oracle model proofs. We accomplish these results by developing new tools for arguing that quantum algorithms cannot distinguish between two oracle distributions. Using a particular class of oracle distributions that we call semi-constant distributions, we argue that the aforementioned cryptosystems are secure against quantum adversaries.

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