Key Recovery Attack on the Cubic ABC Simple Matrix Multivariate Encryption Scheme

2017 ◽  
pp. 543-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dustin Moody ◽  
Ray Perlner ◽  
Daniel Smith-Tone
Keyword(s):  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Simple Matrix ◽  
Key Recovery Attack

Cryptanalysis of Cramer-Shoup Like Cryptosystems Based on Index Exchangeable Family

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jinhui liu ◽  
Yong Yu ◽  
Bo Yang ◽  
Jianwei Jia ◽  
Qiqi Lai
Keyword(s):  
Linear Equation ◽  
Linear Group ◽  
Personal Computer ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Encryption And Decryption ◽  
Key Recovery Attack

The Cramer-Shoup (CS) like cryptosystem based on index exchangeable family (IEF) construction is a novel scheme introduced in Asiaccs 2016 by Li et al.. Its versatility was illustrated by building two public key encryption (PKE) schemes, a cramer-shoup encryption scheme based on IEFs, as well as an outsourcing technique based on non-abelian analog. However, the two schemes are not secure over the recommended linear group of Li et al. For them, we provide a new key-recovery attack by solving a linear equation respectively. Furthermore, we peel off complex encryption and decryption processes and propose more than three different attack methods. Finally, we give a corresponding example to illustrate the correctness of our attack methods. Our attack methods break an instance of claiming 80 bit security less than one minute under a personal computer.

A Key Recovery Attack on Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (12) ◽  
pp. 2999-3004
Author(s):  
Yan Guang ◽  
Yue-fei Zhu ◽  
Chun-xiang Gu ◽  
Yong-hui Zheng ◽  
Quan-you Tang
Keyword(s):  
Homomorphic Encryption ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Fully Homomorphic Encryption ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attack

scholarly journals Improved Cryptanalysis of a Fully Homomorphic Symmetric Encryption Scheme

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Quanbo Qu ◽  
Baocang Wang ◽  
Yuan Ping ◽  
Zhili Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Computing ◽  
Big Data ◽  
Homomorphic Encryption ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Symmetric Encryption ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Fully Homomorphic Encryption ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attack ◽  
Outsourced Databases

Homomorphic encryption is widely used in the scenarios of big data and cloud computing for supporting calculations on ciphertexts without leaking plaintexts. Recently, Li et al. designed a symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme for outsourced databases. Wang et al. proposed a successful key-recovery attack on the homomorphic encryption scheme but required the adversary to know some plaintext/ciphertext pairs. In this paper, we propose a new ciphertext-only attack on the symmetric fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Our attack improves the previous Wang et al.’s attack by eliminating the assumption of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We show that the secret key of the user can be recovered by running lattice reduction algorithms twice. Experiments show that the attack successfully and efficiently recovers the secret key of the randomly generated instances with an overwhelming probability.

scholarly journals Cryptanalysis of a Proposal Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem Inside Sn

Cryptography ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
María González Vasco ◽  
Angela Robinson ◽  
Rainer Steinwandt
Keyword(s):  
Symmetric Group ◽  
Efficient Method ◽  
Chinese Remainder Theorem ◽  
Discrete Logarithm ◽  
Discrete Logarithm Problem ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Natural Representation ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attack

In 2008, Doliskani et al. proposed an ElGamal-style encryption scheme using the symmetric group Sn as mathematical platform. In 2012, an improvement of the cryptosystem’s memory requirements was suggested by Othman. The proposal by Doliskani et al. in particular requires the discrete logarithm problem in Sn, using its natural representation, to be hard. Making use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we describe an efficient method to solve this discrete logarithm problem, yielding a polynomial time secret key recovery attack against Doliskani et al.’s proposal.

Structural Key Recovery of Simple Matrix Encryption Scheme Family

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (12) ◽  
pp. 1880-1896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinhui Liu ◽  
Yong Yu ◽  
Bo Yang ◽  
Jianwei Jia ◽  
Shijia Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Simple Matrix

scholarly journals Cryptanalysis of chosen symmetric homomorphic schemes

2015 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian Vizár ◽  
Serge Vaudenay
Keyword(s):  
Homomorphic Encryption ◽  
Key Generation ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Fully Homomorphic Encryption ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attack

Since Gentry’s breakthrough result was introduced in the year 2009, the homomorphic encryption has become a very popular topic. The main contribution of Gentry’s thesis [5] was, that it has proven, that it actually is possible to design a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. However ground-breaking Gentry’s result was, the designs, that employ the bootstrapping technique suffer from terrible performance both in key generation and homomorphic evaluation of circuits. Some authors tried to design schemes, that could evaluate homomorphic circuits of arbitrarily many inputs without need of bootstrapping. This paper introduces the notion of symmetric homomorphic encryption, and analyses the security of four such proposals, published in three different papers ([2], [7], [10]). Our result is a known plaintext key-recovery attack on every one of these schemes.

scholarly journals Cryptanalysis of Loiss Stream Cipher-Revisited

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Lin Ding ◽  
Chenhui Jin ◽  
Jie Guan ◽  
Qiuyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Stream Cipher ◽  
Linear Equations ◽  
Data Complexity ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Systems Of Linear Equations ◽  
Key Recovery Attack ◽  
Better Than

Loiss is a novel byte-oriented stream cipher proposed in 2011. In this paper, based on solving systems of linear equations, we propose an improved Guess and Determine attack on Loiss with a time complexity of 2231and a data complexity of 268, which reduces the time complexity of the Guess and Determine attack proposed by the designers by a factor of 216. Furthermore, a related key chosenIVattack on a scaled-down version of Loiss is presented. The attack recovers the 128-bit secret key of the scaled-down Loiss with a time complexity of 280, requiring 264chosenIVs. The related key attack is minimal in the sense that it only requires one related key. The result shows that our key recovery attack on the scaled-down Loiss is much better than an exhaustive key search in the related key setting.

Combinatorial Rank Attacks Against the Rectangular Simple Matrix Encryption Scheme

2020 ◽  
pp. 307-322
Author(s):  
Daniel Apon ◽  
Dustin Moody ◽  
Ray Perlner ◽  
Daniel Smith-Tone ◽  
Javier Verbel
Keyword(s):  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Simple Matrix

Quantum key-recovery attack on Feistel structures

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Dong ◽  
Xiaoyun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Key Recovery ◽  
Key Recovery Attack
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