Secure Computation of the Vector Dominance Problem

Information Security Practice and Experience - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-79104-1_23 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 319-333 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jin Yuan ◽

Qingsong Ye ◽

Huaxiong Wang ◽

Josef Pieprzyk

Keyword(s):

Secure Computation ◽

Vector Dominance

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AN EXTENDED VECTOR DOMINANCE MODEL : ITS IMPLICATIONS ON MESON DECAYS AND e+ e- ANNIHILATION INTO HADRONS

Le Journal de Physique Colloques ◽

10.1051/jphyscol:1971313 ◽

1971 ◽

Vol 32 (C3) ◽

pp. C3-93-C3-97

Author(s):

A. BRAMÓN ◽

M. GRECO

Keyword(s):

Dominance Model ◽

Meson Decays ◽

Vector Dominance

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Unconditionally Secure Computation with Reduced Interaction

Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2016 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-662-49896-5_15 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 420-447 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Ivan Damgård ◽

Jesper Buus Nielsen ◽

Rafail Ostrovsky ◽

Adi Rosén

Keyword(s):

Secure Computation

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Privacy Preserving Deep Learning based on Multi-Party Secure Computation: A Survey

IEEE Internet of Things Journal ◽

10.1109/jiot.2021.3058638 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-1

Author(s):

Qiao Zhang ◽

Chunsheng Xin ◽

Hongyi Wu

Keyword(s):

Deep Learning ◽

Privacy Preserving ◽

Secure Computation

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Actively revealing card attack on card-based protocols

Natural Computing ◽

10.1007/s11047-020-09838-8 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Ken Takashima ◽

Daiki Miyahara ◽

Takaaki Mizuki ◽

Hideaki Sone

Keyword(s):

Secure Computation ◽

Malicious Attack ◽

Formal Framework ◽

Almost All ◽

And Function

AbstractIn 1989, den Boer presented the first card-based protocol, called the “five-card trick,” that securely computes the AND function using a deck of physical cards via a series of actions such as shuffling and turning over cards. This protocol enables a couple to confirm their mutual love without revealing their individual feelings. During such a secure computation protocol, it is important to keep any information about the inputs secret. Almost all existing card-based protocols are secure under the assumption that all players participating in a protocol are semi-honest or covert, i.e., they do not deviate from the protocol if there is a chance that they will be caught when cheating. In this paper, we consider a more malicious attack in which a player as an active adversary can reveal cards illegally without any hesitation. Against such an actively revealing card attack, we define the t-secureness, meaning that no information about the inputs leaks even if at most t cards are revealed illegally. We then actually design t-secure AND protocols. Thus, our contribution is the construction of the first formal framework to handle actively revealing card attacks as well as their countermeasures.

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