Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard Using a Single Fault

A Fault-Resistant scheme has been proposed to secure the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attack. In this paper, a hybrid countermeasure has been presented in order to protect a 32-bits AES architecture proposed for resource-constrained embedded systems. A comparative study between the most well-known fault detection schemes in terms of fault detection capabilities and implementation cost has been proposed. Based on this study, we propose a hybrid fault resistant scheme to secure the AES using the parity detection for linear operations and the time redundancy for SubBytes operation. The proposed scheme is implemented on the Virtex-5 Xilinx FPGA board in order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed fault-resistant scheme in terms of area, time costs and fault coverage (FC). Experimental results prove that the countermeasure achieves a FC with about 98,82% of the injected faults detected during the 32-bits AES process. The area overhead of the proposed countermeasure is about 14% and the additional time delay is about 13%.

Download Full-text

A Differential Fault Analysis on AES Key Schedule Using Single Fault

2011 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography ◽

10.1109/fdtc.2011.10 ◽

2011 ◽

Cited By ~ 21

Author(s):

Sk. Subidh Ali ◽

Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Keyword(s):

Fault Analysis ◽

Single Fault ◽

Key Schedule ◽

Differential Fault Analysis

Download Full-text

DESIV: Differential Fault Analysis of SIV-Rijndael256 with a Single Fault

2020 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) ◽

10.1109/host45689.2020.9300267 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Aikata ◽

Banashri Karmakar ◽

Dhiman Saha

Keyword(s):

Fault Analysis ◽

Single Fault ◽

Differential Fault Analysis

Download Full-text

Towards Optimized DFA Attacks on AES under Multibyte Random Fault Model

Security and Communication Networks ◽

10.1155/2018/2870475 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 ◽

pp. 1-9

Author(s):

Ruyan Wang ◽

Xiaohan Meng ◽

Yang Li ◽

Jian Wang

Keyword(s):

Fault Model ◽

Fault Analysis ◽

Advanced Encryption Standard ◽

Security Assessment ◽

Secret Key ◽

Key Recovery ◽

Differential Fault Analysis ◽

Recovery Strategies ◽

Secret Keys ◽

Fault Distribution

Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is one of the most practical methods to recover the secret keys from real cryptographic devices. In particular, DFA on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been massively researched for many years for both single-byte and multibyte fault model. For AES, the first proposed DFA attack requires 6 pairs of ciphertexts to identify the secret key under multibyte fault model. Until now, the most efficient DFA under multibyte fault model proposed in 2017 can complete most of the attacks within 3 pairs of ciphertexts. However, we note that the attack is not fully optimized since no clear optimization goal was set. In this work, we introduce two optimization goals as the fewest ciphertext pairs and the least computational complexity. For these goals, we manage to figure out the corresponding optimized key recovery strategies, which further increase the efficiency of DFA attacks on AES. A more accurate security assessment of AES can be completed based on our study of DFA attacks on AES. Considering the variations of fault distribution, the improvement to the attack has been analyzed and verified.

Download Full-text