New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia

2012 ◽  
pp. 80-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongxia Bai ◽  
Leibo Li
Keyword(s):  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Differential Attacks

New impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Crypton

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 222-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Mala ◽  
Mohsen Shakiba ◽  
Mohammad Dakhilalian
Keyword(s):  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Differential Attacks

scholarly journals Related-Key Impossible Differential Attacks on Crypton

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 154-161
Author(s):  
Yuechuan Wei ◽  
Chao Li ◽  
Bing Sun
Keyword(s):  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Differential Attacks

scholarly journals Improved Impossible Differential Attacks on Large-Block Rijndael

2013 ◽  
pp. 126-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingju Wang ◽  
Dawu Gu ◽  
Vincent Rijmen ◽  
Ya Liu ◽  
Jiazhe Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Block ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Differential Attacks

Improved Impossible Differential Attacks on Large-Block Rijndael

2008 ◽  
pp. 298-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Wenling Wu ◽  
Je Hong Park ◽  
Bon Wook Koo ◽  
Yongjin Yeom
Keyword(s):  
Large Block ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Differential Attacks

scholarly journals On the Complexity of Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Qianqian Yang ◽  
Lei Hu ◽  
Danping Shi ◽  
Yosuke Todo ◽  
Siwei Sun
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Differential Analysis ◽  
Differential Attack ◽  
Symmetric Key ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Complexity Estimation ◽  
Impossible Differential Attack ◽  
Differential Attacks ◽  
Impossible Differentials ◽  
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

While impossible differential attack is one of the most well-known and familiar techniques for symmetric-key cryptanalysts, its subtlety and complicacy make the construction and verification of such attacks difficult and error-prone. We introduce a new set of notations for impossible differential analysis. These notations lead to unified formulas for estimation of data complexities of ordinary impossible differential attacks and attacks employing multiple impossible differentials. We also identify an interesting point from the new formulas: in most cases, the data complexity is only related to the form of the underlying distinguisher and has nothing to do with how the differences at the beginning and the end of the distinguisher propagate in the outer rounds. We check the formulas with some examples, and the results are all matching. Since the estimation of the time complexity is flawed in some situations, in this work, we show under which condition the formula is valid and give a simple time complexity estimation for impossible differential attack which is always achievable.

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