The Relation Between Right to Request Tort Liability and Right to Request Property Rights

Damage to property and (or) non-property rights of persons occurs quite often. The right to compensation for such damage is indisputable. However, civil doctrine ambiguously addresses the issue of risk sharing in tort obligations. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to discuss approaches to the distribution of risk of harm in delictual responsibility and to determine their effectiveness from an economic and legal standpoint. The paper, based on economic and systematic analysis using dialectical, comparative, logical-dogmatic and other methods, including economics, describes the approaches to determining the purpose of tort law and its ability to ensure effective distribution of risk of harm. It has been proven that tort law can have direct regulatory consequences by restraining behaviour and sharing risks. It is concluded that the task of tort law is the optimal distribution of risk of harm between the perpetrator and the victim and to ensure the implementation of risky activities only if its social value justifies the risk. Based on the economic analysis of tort law, it has been substantiated that the distribution of the risk of damage in tort liability is carried out through the institutions of insurance and liability. Insurance is cost-effective when it comes to compensation for damage. However, only liability, in addition to the function of compensation, can also perform the function of preliminary prevention of harm. Therefore, the risk of causing harm in tort liability is mainly borne by the person who caused the damage. In obligations to compensate for damage caused by a source of increased danger, a person who on the appropriate legal basis (property rights, other property rights, contracts, leases, etc.) owns a vehicle, mechanism, other object, the use, storage or maintenance of which creates an increased danger, bears such risk even in the absence of guilt in causing harm. The grounds for imposing such risk on the victim are his intention or force majeure. It is this approach to the distribution of harm risk in tort liability that is fair and cost-effective and contributes to public well-being

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Analysis of the Expansion of Punitive Damages in the Tort Liability of Intellectual Property Rights

Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Humanities Science, Management and Education Technology (HSMET 2017) ◽

10.2991/hsmet-17.2017.228 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Xu WenFeng

Keyword(s):

Intellectual Property ◽

Property Rights ◽

Intellectual Property Rights ◽

Punitive Damages ◽

Tort Liability

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The Exchange Order

10.1093/oso/9780190694272.001.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Richard Adelstein

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Social System ◽

Marginal Cost ◽

Criminal Liability ◽

Corrective Justice ◽

Tort Liability ◽

Voluntary Exchange ◽

Marginal Cost Pricing

This book illuminates a comprehensive social system that comprises explicit markets, tort liability, and criminal liability, and describes each of these three institutions as serving the same function in different social and physical circumstances. It defines exchanges as compensated transfers of rights and objects among individuals, and shows that markets, tort, and crime each operate to organize and facilitate, to govern, exchange of a particular kind of right in a particular exchange environment to which its own rules and procedures are well suited. Under perfect conditions, each operates to move rights and objects from lower- to higher-valuing owners by requiring every taker of rights to compensate every loser in full for the costs of the taking. Markets can organize voluntary exchange of property rights only where theft can be deterred, but when rights or objects are stolen, an involuntary transfer is initiated, and markets are incapable of organizing the completion of the involuntary exchange by compensating the victim. This is the role of tort and criminal liability, which complete the involuntary transaction begun by the theft by imposing a compensatory liability price on every offender equal to the costs imposed by the theft. Marginal-cost pricing in markets controls voluntary, lawful cost imposition by distinguishing inefficient from efficient cost imposition and encouraging the latter, and corrective justice in tort and crime, each in an institutional domain determined by the character of the rights being traded, controls involuntary, unlawful cost imposition in the same way.

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