Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process

1994 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Howard
2016 ◽  
Vol 326 ◽  
pp. 59-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Martínez-Cánovas ◽  
Elena Del Val ◽  
Vicente Botti ◽  
Penélope Hernández ◽  
Miguel Rebollo

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Muehlenbernd ◽  
Przemyslaw Zywiczynski ◽  
Sławomir Wacewicz

Linguistic Politeness (LP) is a fascinating domain of language, as it directly interfaces with human social behavior. Here, we show how game theory, as a higher-order theory of behavior, can provide the tools to understand and model LP phenomena. We show this for the specific case of requests, where the magnitude of request and the resultant Rate of Imposition are subsumed under a more powerful explanatory principle: alignment of interests. We put forward the Politeness Equilibrium Principle (PEP), whereby the more disalignment there is between the interests of Speaker and Hearer, the more LP Speaker needs to offset the imbalance. In the second part of our paper, we flesh out our ideas by means of a formal model inspired by evolutionary signaling theory, and provide a mathematical proof showing that the model follows the PEP. We see this work as an important first step in the direction of reconciling theories of language with signaling theory, by incorporating language into more general models of communication.


Author(s):  
Stephen G. Walker

Role theory as an empirical theory of international relations has an underlying logical structure with the ability to generate different models of cooperation and conflict in world politics at multiple levels of analysis: system-oriented models of incentives and role constraints; actor-centered models of role conceptions and expectations; action-focused models of cues and role enactment. The emphasis at each of these levels of analysis is on strategic interaction, which makes role theory a theory of international relations between ego and alter as well as a theory of their respective foreign policy decisions. The logical and empirical applications of role theory’s models to world politics have morphed from metaphor and analogy into formal models of prediction and explanation that meet the criteria of testability associated with an empirical theory of international relations. These criteria include the logical rules of deductive inference and the correspondence rules of empirical falsifiability associated with the systematic comparison of empirical cases. The pattern of migration and evolution of role resembles the earlier pattern of importing game as a metaphor and introducing the logical structure of game theory into the field of international relations. Binary role theory employs the concepts of role theory and a set of game theory models to analyze conflict and cooperation in world politics. The role metaphor and the concepts of binary role theory provide a substantive “theory of payoffs” for game theory. The latter’s formal models help transform the logical structure of role theory from a metaphor or analogy to a logically coherent and empirically testable theory of international relations.


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