Hyper-Contradictions, Generalized Truth Values and Logics of Truth and Falsehood

Yaroslav Shramko; Heinrich Wansing

doi:10.1007/s10849-006-9015-0

Hyper-Contradictions, Generalized Truth Values and Logics of Truth and Falsehood

Journal of Logic Language and Information ◽

10.1007/s10849-006-9015-0 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 15 (4) ◽

pp. 403-424 ◽

Cited By ~ 31

Author(s):

Yaroslav Shramko ◽

Heinrich Wansing

Keyword(s):

Truth Values ◽

Generalized Truth Values

Download Full-text

The Logic of Generalized Truth Values and the Logic of Bilattices

Studia Logica ◽

10.1007/s11225-014-9546-3 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 103 (1) ◽

pp. 91-112 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

Sergei P. Odintsov ◽

Heinrich Wansing

Keyword(s):

Truth Values ◽

Generalized Truth Values

Download Full-text

A Judgmental Reconstruction of Some of Professor Woleński’s Logical and Philosophical Writings

Studia Humana ◽

10.2478/sh-2020-0029 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 9 (3-4) ◽

pp. 72-103

Author(s):

Fabien Schang

Keyword(s):

Coherence Theory ◽

Abstract Object ◽

Truth Values ◽

Multiple Uses ◽

Generalized Truth Values ◽

Philosophical Writings

AbstractRoman Suszko said that “Obviously, any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact, Łukasiewicz did not actualize it.” The aim of the present paper is to qualify this ‘obvious’ statement through a number of logical and philosophical writings by Professor Jan Woleński, all focusing on the nature of truth-values and their multiple uses in philosophy. It results in a reconstruction of such an abstract object, doing justice to what Suszko held a ‘mad’ project within a generalized logic of judgments. Four main issues raised by Woleński will be considered to test the insightfulness of such generalized truth-values, namely: the principle of bivalence, the logic of scepticism, the coherence theory of truth, and nothingness.

Download Full-text