ON MODELS FOR CROSS-WORLD PREDICATION

Я выдвигаю два методологических возражения против концепции кросс-мировой предикации, которую предлагает Е. Борисов: (1) Данный подход не учитывает того обстоятельства, что истинностный статус утверждений модального дискурса, как правило, интересует нас не в теоретико-модельном смысле, а в смысле истинности simpliciter. При этом данный подход не оставляет нам никакой возможности говорить о модальной эпистемологии и содержательном обосновании модальных утверждений. (2) Данный подход не учитывает роли воображения и ментального моделирования в том, что Е. Борисовым называется «интуитивным пониманием» рассматриваемых им утверждений. Учёт воображения и ментального моделирования, в свою очередь, переводит содержание подавляющего числа рассматриваемых Евгением примеров в разряд эпистемической модальности говорящего. При этом корректный переход от субъективной эпистемической модальности говорящего к любым типам объективных модальностей в рамках подхода Евгения попросту не может быть осуществлён, поскольку такой переход предполагает наличие внятной концепции модальной эпистемологии, чего Евгений нам не предлагает. Истинность любых рассматриваемых им примеров - это истинность на моделях говорящих, то есть на фреймах, в рамках которых говорящие полагают некоторые миры достижимыми из актуального. I raise two objections to E. Borisov’s methodology for building the theory of cross-world predication: (1) This approach does not take into account the fact that usually we are interested in truth values of modal claims not in the model-theoretical sense, but in the sense of truth simpliciter. However, this approach does not leave us any opportunity to talk about modal truths simpliciter, modal epistemology and substantive truth conditions for modal claims. (2) This approach does not take into account the role of imagination and mental modeling in what E. Borisov calls the ‘intuitive meaning’ of the analysed claims. However, taking into account imagination and mental modeling shows that the vast majority of the cases under consideration deal with epistemic and not alethic modality. In the absence of any modal epistemology we cannot simply postulate the validity of modal truths. Such postulation would be puzzling and unexplainable. And without such postulation of factuality, all the modalities we consider turn out epistemic.

The Presheaf of Conditional Expectations, a Bridge Between Probability and Intuitionistic Truth Value

Research for a theory of quantum gravity has recently led to the use of presheaf topos. Quantum uncertainty is linked to the truth values of intuitionistic logic. This paper proposes transposing this model into a classic probability context, that of conditional mathematical expectations. A simulation of Brownian motion is offered for illustrative purposes.

The Post-Screen through Virtual Reality, Holograms and Light Projections

Screens are ubiquitous today. They display information; present image worlds; are portable; connect to mobile networks; mesmerize. However, contemporary screen media also seek to eliminate the presence of the screen and the visibilities of its boundaries. As what is image becomes increasingly indistinguishable against the viewer's actual surroundings, this unsettling prompts re-examination about not only what is the screen, but also how the screen demarcates and what it stands for in relation to our understanding of our realities in, outside and against images. Through case studies drawn from three media technologies - Virtual Reality; holograms; and light projections - this book develops new theories of the surfaces on and spaces in which images are displayed today, interrogating critical lines between art and life; virtuality and actuality; truth and lies. What we have today is not just the contestation of the real against illusion or the unreal, but the disappearance itself of difference and a gluttony of the unreal which both connect up to current politics of distorted truth values and corrupted terms of information. <i>The Post-Screen through Virtual Reality, Holograms and Light Projections: Where Screen Boundaries Lie</i> is thus about not only where the image's borders and demarcations are established, but also the screen boundary as the instrumentation of today's intense virtualizations that do not tell the truth. In all this, a new imagination for images emerges, with a new space for cultures of presence and absence, definitions of object and representation, and understandings of dis- and re-placement - the post-screen.

The Post-Screen Through Virtual Reality, Holograms and Light Projections

Screens are ubiquitous today. They display information; present image worlds; are portable; connect to mobile networks; mesmerize. However, contemporary screen media also seek to eliminate the presence of the screen and the visibilities of its boundaries. As what is image becomes increasingly indistinguishable against the viewer’s actual surroundings, this unsettling prompts re-examination about not only what is the screen, but also how the screen demarcates and what it stands for in relation to our understanding of our realities in, outside and against images. Through case studies drawn from three media technologies – Virtual Reality; holograms; and light projections – this book develops new theories of the surfaces on and spaces in which images are displayed today, interrogating critical lines between art and life; virtuality and actuality; truth and lies. What we have today is not just the contestation of the real against illusion or the unreal, but the disappearance itself of difference and a gluttony of the unreal which both connect up to current politics of distorted truth values and corrupted terms of information. The Post-Screen Through Virtual Reality, Holograms and Light Projections: Where Screen Boundaries Lie is thus about not only where the image’s borders and demarcations are established, but also the screen boundary as the instrumentation of today’s intense virtualizations that do not tell the truth. In all this, a new imagination for images emerges, with a new space for cultures of presence and absence, definitions of object and representation, and understandings of dis- and re-placement – the post-screen.

IN DEFENSE OF THE SELF-REFERENCING QUANTIFIER Sx. APPROXIMATION OF SELF-REFERENTIAL SENTENCES BY DYNAMIC SYSTEMS

Arguments in defense of introducing the self-referencing quantifier Sx and its approximation on dynamical systems are consistently presented. The case of classical logic is described in detail. Generated 3-truth tables that match Priest’s tables (Priest 1979). In the process of constructing 4-truth tables, two more truth values were revealed that did not coincide with the original ones. Therefore, the closed tables turned out to be 6-digit.

A Many-valued Logic for Lexicographic Preference Representation

We introduce lexicographic logic, an extension of propositional logic that can represent a variety of preferences, most notably lexicographic ones. The proposed logic supports a simple new connective whose semantics can be defined in terms of finite lists of truth values. We demonstrate that, despite the well-known theoretical limitations that pose barriers to the quantitative representation of lexicographic preferences, there exists a subset of the rational numbers over which the proposed new connective can be naturally defined. Lexicographic logic can be used to define in a simple way some well-known preferential operators, like "A and if possible B", and "A or failing that B". We argue that the new logic is an effective formalism for ranking query results according to the satisfaction level of user preferences.

True by Default

This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call truth-value-maker theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers.

Examining Automatic Stereotyping From a Propositional Perspective: Is Automatic Stereotyping Sensitive to Relational and Validity Information?

Research on automatic stereotyping is dominated by the idea that automatic stereotyping reflects the activation of (group–trait) associations. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 391), we tested predictions derived from an alternative perspective that suggests that automatic stereotyping is the result of the activation of propositional representations that, unlike associations, can encode relational information and have truth values. Experiment 1 found that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the validity of information about pairs of traits and groups. Experiment 2 showed that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the specific relations (e.g., whether a particular group is more or less friendly than a reference person) between pairs of traits and groups. Interestingly, both experiments found a weaker influence of validity/relational information on automatic stereotyping than on non-automatic stereotyping. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on automatic stereotyping.

Encoding many-valued logic in $\lambda$-calculus

We will extend the well-known Church encoding of Boolean logic into $\lambda$-calculus to an encoding of McCarthy's $3$-valued logic into a suitable infinitary extension of $\lambda$-calculus that identifies all unsolvables by $\bot$, where $\bot$ is a fresh constant. This encoding refines to $n$-valued logic for $n\in\{4,5\}$. Such encodings also exist for Church's original $\lambda\mathbf{I}$-calculus. By way of motivation we consider Russell's paradox, exploiting the fact that the same encoding allows us also to calculate truth values of infinite closed propositions in this infinitary setting.