This chapter situates PE within the context of the broader debate between Epistemic Liberalism (which holds, roughly, that it is reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is reason for doubting it) and Epistemic Conservatism (the view that, roughly, it is not reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is independent reason to think that the appearances are reliable). PE is squarely within the Liberal camp. Therefore, after explaining some of the primary elements of Liberal/Conservative debate in epistemology, two of the primary challenges faced by Liberal views like PE are examined. The first is, again, the problem of bootstrapping, which any theory that allows for immediate justification seems to run into. The second is White’s Bayesian objection to PC (introduced in Chapter 1), according to which Liberalism, and so PE, is flawed because it is incompatible with probabilistic reasoning. It is shown that PE is not troubled by these challenges. The upshot of the chapter is that Liberalism, when exemplified in PE, is victorious over Conservatism.
Accuracy and epistemic conservatism
