Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

1990 ◽  
pp. 135-143
Author(s):  
P. Aarne Vesilind ◽  
J. Jeffrey Peirce ◽  
Ruth F. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water

Microtargeting the acquisition of cropping rights to reduce nonpoint source water pollution

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 623-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Kozloff ◽  
Steven J. Taff ◽  
Yingmin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water

Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

1998 ◽  
pp. 137-143
Author(s):  
J. Jeffrey Peirce ◽  
Ruth F. Weiner ◽  
P. Aarne Vesilind
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water

Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

1988 ◽  
pp. 215-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Aarne Vesilind ◽  
J. Jeffrey Peirce ◽  
Ruth F. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water

scholarly journals Multiple Agents, and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies

1999 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodney B.W. Smith ◽  
Theodore D. Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Agricultural Nonpoint Source

Assuming asymmetric information over farmer profits and zero transaction costs, prior literature has suggested that when regulating nonpoint source water pollution, a tax on management practices (inputs) can implement full-information allocations and is superior to a tax on estimated runoff. Using mechanism design theory under asymmetric information, this paper shows that under the same assumptions, management practice taxes and taxes on estimated runoff are equally efficient.

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