An N-Enterprise investment game under risk of domino accidents in a chemical cluster: Nash and pareto equilibria

2020 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 106705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Wu ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Yuan Cheng ◽  
Tatsushi Nishi ◽  
T.C.E. Cheng
2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Morrison ◽  
E. Elisabet (Lisa) Rutstrrm
Keyword(s):  

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (10-11) ◽  
pp. 19-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.E.M. Borm ◽  
M.J.M. Jansen ◽  
J.A.M. Potters ◽  
S.H. Tijs

2006 ◽  
Vol 371 (2) ◽  
pp. 610-626 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto da Silva ◽  
Ana L.C. Bazzan ◽  
Alexandre T. Baraviera ◽  
Sílvio R. Dahmen

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-112
Author(s):  
S. Solodukhin ◽  
◽  
E. Shaitanova ◽  

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Анна Тур ◽  
Anna Tur ◽  
Леон Аганесович Петросян ◽  
Leon Petrosyan

The paper describes a class of differential games on networks. The construction of cooperative optimality principles using a special type of characteristic function that takes into account the network structure of the game is investigated. The core, the Shapley value and the tau-value are used as cooperative optimality principles. The results are demonstrated on a model of a differential research investment game, where the Shapley value and the tau-value are explicitly constructed.


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