On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options

2021 ◽  
pp. 110239
Author(s):  
Pinaki Mandal ◽  
Souvik Roy
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Priority ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Top Trading Cycles ◽  
Strategy Proof

Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroǧlu ◽  
Yeon-Koo Che ◽  
Parag A. Pathak ◽  
Alvin E. Roth ◽  
Olivier Tercieux
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
New Orleans ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Boston Public Schools ◽  
Top Trading Cycles ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
One To One ◽  
Serial Dictatorship

Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. (JEL C78, D61)

Joint Outside Options

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Manzini ◽  
Marco Mariotti
Keyword(s):  
Outside Options
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