Do Women Respond Less to Performance Pay? Building Evidence from Multiple Experiments

Existing empirical work raises the hypothesis that performance pay—whatever its output gains—may widen the gender earnings gap because women may respond less to incentives. We evaluate this possibility by aggregating evidence from existing experiments on performance incentives with male and female subjects. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model, we estimate both the average effect and heterogeneity across studies. We find that the gender response difference is close to zero and heterogeneity across studies is small, while performance pay increases output by 0.36 standard deviations on average. The data thus support agency theory for men and women alike. (JEL C11, C90, J16, J31, J33)

Optimal Lockdown in a Commuting Network

We study optimal dynamic lockdowns against COVID-19 within a commuting network. Our framework integrates canonical spatial epidemiology and trade models and is applied to cities with varying initial viral spread: Seoul, Daegu, and the New York City metropolitan area (NYM). Spatial lockdowns achieve substantially smaller income losses than uniform lockdowns. In the NYM and Daegu—with large initial shocks—the optimal lockdown restricts inflows to central districts before gradual relaxation, while in Seoul it imposes low temporal but large spatial variation. Actual commuting reductions were too weak in central locations in Daegu and the NYM and too strong across Seoul. (JEL H51, I12, I18, R23, R41)

Teenage Driving, Mortality, and Risky Behaviors

We investigate the effect of teenage driving on mortality and risky behaviors in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. We estimate that total mortality rises by 5.84 deaths per 100,000 (15 percent) at the minimum legal driving age cutoff, driven by an increase in motor vehicle fatalities of 4.92 deaths per 100,000 (44 percent). We also find that poisoning deaths, which are caused primarily by drug overdoses, rise by 0.31 deaths per 100,000 (29 percent) at the cutoff and that this effect is concentrated among females. Our findings show that teenage driving contributes to sex differences in risky drug use behaviors. (JEL I12, J13, J16, R41)

Long-Term Effects of the Targeting the Ultra Poor Program

This paper studies the long-run effects of a “ big-push” program providing a large asset transfer to the poorest Indian households. In a randomized controlled trial that follows these households over ten years, we find positive effects on consumption (0.6 SD), food security (0.1 SD), income (0.3 SD), and health (0.2 SD). These effects grow for the first seven years following the transfer and persist until year ten. One main channel for persistence is that treated households take better advantage of opportunities to diversify into more lucrative wage employment, especially through migration. (JEL I32, I38, J22, J31, O12, O18)

The Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains and Revenue-Maximizing Rates

This paper uses a direct-projections approach to estimate the effect of capital gains taxation on realizations at the state level and then develops a framework for determining revenue-maximizing rates at the federal level. We find that the elasticity of revenues with respect to the tax rate over a 10-year period is −0.5 to −0.3, indicating that capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves and that a 5 percentage point rate increase would yield $18 to $30 billion in annual federal tax revenue. Our long-run estimates yield revenue-maximizing capital gains tax rates of 38 to 47 percent. (JEL E62, H25, H71)

Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction

We study a simple variant of the house allocation problem (one-sided matching). We demonstrate that agents with recursive preferences may systematically prefer one allocation mechanism to the other, even among mechanisms that are considered to be the same in standard models, in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over successful matchings. Using this, we propose a new priority groups mechanism and provide conditions under which it is preferred to two popular mechanisms, random top cycle and random serial dictatorship. (JEL C78, D44, D82)

Optimal Targeted Lockdowns in a Multigroup SIR Model

We study targeted lockdowns in a multigroup SIR model where infection, hospitalization, and fatality rates vary between groups—in particular between the “young,” the “middle-aged,” and the “old.” Our model enables a tractable quantitative analysis of optimal policy. For baseline parameter values for the COVID-19 pandemic applied to the US, we find that optimal policies differentially targeting risk/age groups significantly outperform optimal uniform policies and most of the gains can be realized by having stricter protective measures such as lockdowns on the more vulnerable, old group. Intuitively, a strict and long lockdown for the old both reduces infections and enables less strict lockdowns for the lower-risk groups. (JEL H51, I12, I18, J13, J14)

Cheating with Models

Beliefs and decisions are often based on confronting models with data. What is the largest “fake” correlation that a misspecified model can generate, even when it passes an elementary misspecification test? We study an “analyst” who fits a model, represented by a directed acyclic graph, to an objective (multivariate) Gaussian distribution. We characterize the maximal estimated pairwise correlation for generic Gaussian objective distributions, subject to the constraint that the estimated model preserves the marginal distribution of any individual variable. As the number of model variables grows, the estimated correlation can become arbitrarily close to one regardless of the objective correlation. (JEL D83, C13, C46, C51)

The Difficulty of Easy Projects

We consider binary private contributions to public good projects that succeed when the number of contributors exceeds a threshold. We show that for standard distributions of contribution costs, valuable threshold public good projects are more likely to succeed when they require more contributors. Raising the success threshold reduces free-riding incentives, and this strategic effect dominates the direct effect. Common intuition that easier projects are more likely to succeed only holds for cost distributions with right tails fatter than Cauchy. Our results suggest government grants can reduce the likelihood that valuable threshold public good projects succeed. (JEL D71, H41, H81)