Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games

2020 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 41-45
Author(s):  
Liang Mao
Keyword(s):  
2002 ◽  
Vol 308 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 391-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward W. Piotrowski ◽  
Jan Sładkowski
Keyword(s):  

Sociometry ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald E. Anderson

1980 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 12-15
Author(s):  
George Strauss ◽  
James W. Driscoll

Econometrica ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy J. Stone
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 87-104
Author(s):  
Anke Gerber

AbstractIn this paper we prove that the symmetric Nash solution is a risk neutral von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function on the class of pure bargaining games. Our result corrects an error in Roth (Econometrica 46:587–594, 983, 1978) and generalizes Roth’s result to bargaining games with arbitrary status quo.


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