scholarly journals Differential Fault Attack on the Stream Cipher LIZARD

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-541
Author(s):  
MA Zhen ◽  
TIAN Tian ◽  
QI Wenfeng
IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 37697-37706
Author(s):  
Haoxiang Luo ◽  
Weijian Chen ◽  
Xinyue Ming ◽  
Yifan Wu

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 212794-212802
Author(s):  
Seonghyuck Lim ◽  
Jonghyeok Lee ◽  
Dong-Guk Han

Author(s):  
Mustafa Khairallah ◽  
Jakub Breier ◽  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Anupam Chattopadhyay

Author(s):  
F. E. Potestad-Ordonez ◽  
C. J. Jimenez-Fernandez ◽  
C. Baena-Oliva ◽  
P. Parra-Fernandez ◽  
M. Valencia-Barrero
Keyword(s):  

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Xiaoling Xia ◽  
Dawu Gu ◽  
Zhiqiang Liu ◽  
Juanru Li ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Bhagwan Bathe ◽  
Siddhartha Tiwari ◽  
Ravi Anand ◽  
Dibyendu Roy ◽  
Subhamoy Maitra

2013 ◽  
Vol 850-851 ◽  
pp. 529-532
Author(s):  
Feng Liu ◽  
Xuan Liu ◽  
Shuai Meng

In this paper, on the basis of the nibble-based faulty model and the differential analysis principle, we propose a kind of attack on the new low-cost LED block cipher which combine differential fault attack with meet-in-the-middle attack. We inject the nibble faulty at round 29, which is earlier than other papers. More precisely, ciphertext need to be multiplied by a matrix before add the key in order to reduce the effect from key spreading. Finally, the key candidates are recovered by solving the equation set. Hence the secret key bits can be recovered faster than exhaustive search.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongyue Wang ◽  
Xiaoyang Dong ◽  
Keting Jia ◽  
Jingyuan Zhao

The confidentiality of GSM cellular telephony depends on the security of A5 family of cryptosystems. As an algorithm in this family survived from cryptanalysis, A5/3 is based on the block cipher KASUMI. This paper describes a novel differential fault attack on KAUSMI with a 64-bit key. Taking advantage of some mathematical observations on the FL, FO functions, and key schedule, only one 16-bit word fault is required to recover all information of the 64-bit key. The time complexity is only 232encryptions. We have practically simulated the attack on a PC which takes only a few minutes to recover all the key bits. The simulation also experimentally verifies the correctness and complexity.


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