Pan-Arab Nationalism as Westernised Ideology and Politics of Arab States: Between Ba’thism and Nasserism until the Six-Day War

1997 ◽  
pp. 201-217
Author(s):  
Bassam Tibi
2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-238
Author(s):  
Ersun N. Kurtulus

The article presents a critical assessment of the widespread conceptualization of the June 1967 War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states as a pre-emptive war both in academic and non-academic writing. Tracing the origins of the notion of pre-emptive war to international law, the article identifies three necessary conditions for such a war to be classified as pre-emptive: acute crisis combined with high alert levels; vulnerable offensive weapons; and strategic parity as regards to offensive capabilities. On the basis of a re-interpretation of the evidence produced by previous research, this article argues that the circumstances surrounding the Six Day War did not fulfill some of these necessary conditions. This conclusion also is supported by evidence related to the Israeli decision to launch a first strike.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter examines Arab nationalism after the Six Day War of June 1967, which was a seminal event in Arab contemporary history. What the Six Day War did was to irretrievably rob Arab nationalism of the crucial element of unification. While Arabs—in whatever state they lived—continued to recognize their membership in the cultural space called “the Arab world,” a recognition shared by rulers and subjects alike, they no longer truly believed in the viability of organic political unity. The Six Day War had also cost Egypt dearly in life and material. Moreover, beyond these horrendous losses, the war was responsible for many domestic and economic maladies.


Author(s):  
Gareth Stansfield

This chapter examines the Yom Kippur War of 1973 from a foreign policy perspective. It first provides a background on the Arab–Israeli Conflict that began in 1948 with the War of Independence, followed by the Suez Conflict in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967, and culminated in the Yom Kippur War. It then considers the Egyptian build-up to war in 1973 and why Egypt attacked Israel, as well as the peace process that eventually settled the conflict between the two countries via the Camp David Accords. It also analyses the relative normalization of the Egyptian–Israeli relations and the effective breaking of Egypt’s alliance with other Arab states opposed to the existence of Israel. It concludes with an assessment of the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter examines the emergence of “Arab” Egypt. When the idea of a Western alliance threatened to isolate Egypt in 1953, an Egyptian campaign to galvanize the citizens of other Arab states against Western alliances had to tap the most readily acceptable bond that drew Egyptians and the other Arabs together, that of Arab nationalism—the notion that, politically divided as they were, the Arabs still constituted one indivisible nation. Thus, the phenomenal speed with which Arab nationalism became the predominant radical, on the whole anti-Western, ideology in the region in the 1950s resulted in large measure from Egypt’s onslaught against Western alliances. Moreover, Egypt’s undoubted success was aided substantially by two factors: the country’s own capabilities, and Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir’s committed leadership and single-minded pursuit of his goals.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter argues that after the Six Day War, Arab nationalism’s slide toward political marginality became irreversible. What stamped on it the sense of finality was the fact that it was Egypt under Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir that lost. Indeed, Egypt’s devastating defeat was Arab nationalism’s mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the 1950s and 1960s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president. Had it just been Syria or Jordan, or even both, who lost the war, it would not have been the unmitigated disaster for Arab nationalism that the June war turned out to be. But Arab nationalism could not survive the abject humiliation inflicted on its acknowledged prophet, who promised a fabled triumph in this al-Ma‘raka al-Masiriya, the battle of destiny.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Stephan

This paper will attempt to analyze why Lebanon accepts so many refugees instead of initially denying them asylum since Lebanon’s refugee law reflects the country’s unwillingness to integrate refugees into its citizenry. It focuses on the case of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and argues that Lebanon’s historical relations with Palestine and the Arab states, and its economic benefit from the refugees play a more powerful role than the country’s feeling of legal responsibility for granting these refugees asylum. The paper is divided into two sections; the first examines Lebanon’s refugee law and its consequences on the living conditions of refugees in Lebanon. The second section assesses the role of Arab nationalism and the economic benefit from refugees on influencing Lebanon to grant refugees asylum.


1995 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Barnett

What accounts for the development of the Arab states system from the explosive mix of Arab nationalism and sovereignty to their simultaneous existence? To understand this development, one must first examine how institutions can shape the very interests and roles of states in such a manner as to encourage the development of relatively stable expectations and shared norms; that is, regional order. This approach illuminates how inter-Arab interactions and state formation processes led to the consolidation of sovereignty and a meaning of Arab nationalism that is consistent with sovereignty. Consequently, this region highlights how sovereignty—and its lack thereof—is consequential for understanding interstate dynamics, and how different meanings of the nation have different implications for security.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This concluding chapter assesses the legacy of Arab nationalism. It is difficult not to lament the passing of Arab nationalism, particularly when bringing contemporary Arab maladies under scrutiny. With all of its faults and shortcomings, the many achievements of Arab nationalism were undeniable: it led the struggle for independence from the outsider. Under its umbrella, Arab states took determined steps toward social and economic modernity. It also bestowed on the Arabs a sense of dignity after years of colonial humiliation. Moreover, it endowed the nationalist generation of the era with an abiding belief in an inevitable future of progress and success. Nevertheless, Arab nationalism was hardly free of blame when it came to instigating conflict. However, the Cold War then could hardly be compared with the Arab condition of the twenty-first century, characterized as it has been by disintegrating states, wholesale human rights abuses, seemingly irreparable fissures in the fabric of society, and pervasive unbridled barbarism.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document