Shareholder Loans and Earnings Smoothing – Empirical Findings from German Private Firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jochen Bigus ◽  
Stefanie Häfele
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Nor Afifah Shabani ◽  
Saudah Sofian

Smooth earnings are preferred by managers and creditors because they represent a stable business operations as well as low loan default risks and thus creditors reward firms which have smooth earnings with better loan covenant terms and lower interest rates. Nonetheless, recent literature shows that earnings smoothing in public firms is associated with stock price crash risk. Using Altman Z” score to measure firm’s specific bankruptcy risk, this study examines the association between accrual earnings smoothing and bankruptcy risk in liquidating private firms in UK and finds that earnings smoothing significantly negatively affects those firms' bankruptcy risk. The finding implies that financially distressed firms engage with less earnings smoothing, possibly because they do not have the opportunity to engage in accrual earnings smoothing anymore. Nonetheless, further examination shows that these firms engage less with earnings smoothing because they are being monitored by external creditors, indicated by significantly high leverage during the last period before they are being liquidated.


2017 ◽  
pp. 83-99
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Mafrolla ◽  
Viola Nobili

This paper investigates whether and at what extent private firms reduce the quality of their accruals in order to signal a better portrait to the bank and obtain new or larger bank loans. We measure earnings discretionary accruals of a sample of Italian private firms, testing whether new and larger bank loans are associated with a higher (lower) quality of earnings in borrowers' financial reporting. We study bank loan levels and changes and how they impact discretionary accruals and found that, surprisingly, private firms' discretionary accruals are systematically positively affected by an increase in bank loans, although they are negatively affected by the credit worthiness rating assigned to the borrowers. We find that the monitoring role of the banking system with regard to the adoption of discretionary accruals is effective only when the loan is very large. This paper may have implications for policy-makers as it contributes to the understanding of the shortcomings of the banking regulatory system. This is an extremely relevant issue since the excessive amount of non-performing loans held by Italian banks recently threatened the stability of the European Banking Union as a whole.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ole-Kristian Hope ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas ◽  
Dushyantkumar Vyas
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