This chapter presents a series questions in the philosophy of vagueness that will constitute the primary subjects of this book. The stance this book takes on these questions is outlined, and some preliminary ramifications are explored. These include the idea that (i) propositional vagueness is more fundamental than linguistic vagueness; (ii) propositions are not themselves sentence-like; they are coarse grained, and form a complete atomic Boolean algebra; (iii) vague propositions are, moreover, not simply linguistic constructions either such as sets of world-precisification pairs; and (iv) propositional vagueness is to be understood by its role in thought. Specific theses relating to the last idea include the thesis that one’s total evidence can be vague, and that there are vague propositions occupying every evidential role, that disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements in the precise, and that one should not care intrinsically about vague matters.
On the lattice of subalgebras of a Boolean algebra