Price Competition in a Mixed Duopoly

Author(s):  
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar ◽  
Uday Bhanu Sinha
2007 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz

2011 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN CARLOS BÁRCENA-RUIZ ◽  
MÁXIMO SEDANO

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 16-37
Author(s):  
Prabal Roy Chowdhury ◽  
Indrani Roy Chowdhury

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Longfei Wei ◽  
Haiwei Wang ◽  
Jing Wang ◽  
Jialong Hou

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of two sequential-move games, public leadership, and private leadership games. Numerical simulations present complicated dynamic behaviors. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the price adjustment speed increases, and the system eventually becomes chaotic via flip bifurcation. Moreover, the time-delayed feedback control is used to force the system back to stability.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Boleslavsky ◽  
Christopher Cotton ◽  
Haresh B. Gurnani
Keyword(s):  

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