Rational Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 171-196
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Rational Belief ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Theory ◽  
Safety Condition ◽  
Closure Principles ◽  
Order Commitment ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

This chapter generalizes the modal theory of subjective reasons to the epistemic domain and combines it with the first-order commitment that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The result is a modal account of epistemic rationality, according to which there is a safety condition on rational belief distinct from but mirroring the more familiar safety condition on knowledge. The chapter shows that the account delivers plausible closure principles on rational belief and offers a straightforward resolution of the lottery paradox. It also explores the implications of the view for whether it is rational to believe necessary propositions, preface propositions, and Moorean propositions.

Knowledge

2021 ◽  
pp. 148-170
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Theory ◽  
Safety Condition ◽  
Order Commitment

This chapter generalizes the modal theory of possessed reasons to the epistemic domain and combines it with the first-order commitment that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. A fact is a reason for believing a proposition only if, in nearby metaphysically possible worlds in which that fact obtains, the proposition is true. A person possesses that fact as a reason for believing a proposition only if, in nearby epistemically possible worlds in which that fact obtains, the proposition is true. This is an anti-luck or safety condition on possession. The chapter goes on to argue that, if a person possesses a reason for believing a proposition, they are in a position to know it. It shows that this claim is not vulnerable to Gettier-style counterexamples and that it vindicates the idea that knowledge is a norm of belief, an idea supported by reflection on lottery cases and Moorean beliefs.

Attributing Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Rational Belief ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Correct Application ◽  
Mechanical Devices ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
Knowledge Closure

The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. Only purely epistemic properties affect its correct application—not the interests of agents or those who attribute the word to agents. These properties enable “know” to be applied correctly—as it routinely is—to cognitive agents ranging from sophisticated human knowers, who engage in substantial metacognition, to various animals, who know much less and do much less, if any, metacognition, to nonconscious mechanical devices such as drones, robots, and the like. These properties of the word “know” suffice to explain the usage phenomena that contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists invoke to place pressure on an understanding of the word that treats its application as involving no interests of agents, or others. It is also shown that the factivity and the fallibilist-compatibility of the word “know” explain Moorean paradoxes, the preface paradox, and the lottery paradox. A fallibility-sensitive failure of knowledge closure is given along with a similar failure of rational-belief closure. The latter explains why rational agents can nevertheless believe A and B, where A and B contradict each other. A substantial discussion of various kinds of metacognition is given—as well as a discussion of the metacognition literature in cognitive ethology. An appendix offers a new resolution of the hangman paradox, one that turns neither on a failure of knowledge closure nor on a failure of KK.

Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-183
Author(s):  
Georgi Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Safety Condition ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

AbstractMany theorists hold that outright verdicts based on bare statistical evidence are unwarranted. Bare statistical evidence may support high credence, on these views, but does not support outright belief or legal verdicts of culpability. The vignettes that constitute the lottery paradox and the proof paradox are marshalled to support this claim. Some theorists argue, furthermore, that examples of profiling also indicate that bare statistical evidence is insufficient for warranting outright verdicts.I examine Pritchard's and Buchak's treatments of these three kinds of case. Pritchard argues that his safety condition explains the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts in each of the three cases, while Buchak argues that her treatment of the distinction between credence and belief explains this. In these discussions the three kinds of cases – lottery, proof paradox, and profiling – are treated alike. The cases are taken to exhibit the same epistemic features. I identity significant overlooked epistemic differences amongst these three cases; these differences cast doubt on Pritchard's explanation of the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts. Finally, I raise the question of whether we should aim for a unified explanation of the three paradoxes.

scholarly journals THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA AS A LOTTERY PARADOX

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
IGOR DOUVEN ◽  
JAN-WILLEM ROMEIJN
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Discursive Dilemma ◽  
Individual Opinion ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence of votes.

Nozick's acceptance rule and the lottery paradox

Analysis ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 213-216
Author(s):  
R. P. Loui
Keyword(s):  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Acceptance Rule ◽  
The Lottery Paradox
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