Rational Belief

This chapter generalizes the modal theory of subjective reasons to the epistemic domain and combines it with the first-order commitment that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The result is a modal account of epistemic rationality, according to which there is a safety condition on rational belief distinct from but mirroring the more familiar safety condition on knowledge. The chapter shows that the account delivers plausible closure principles on rational belief and offers a straightforward resolution of the lottery paradox. It also explores the implications of the view for whether it is rational to believe necessary propositions, preface propositions, and Moorean propositions.

Knowledge

This chapter generalizes the modal theory of possessed reasons to the epistemic domain and combines it with the first-order commitment that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. A fact is a reason for believing a proposition only if, in nearby metaphysically possible worlds in which that fact obtains, the proposition is true. A person possesses that fact as a reason for believing a proposition only if, in nearby epistemically possible worlds in which that fact obtains, the proposition is true. This is an anti-luck or safety condition on possession. The chapter goes on to argue that, if a person possesses a reason for believing a proposition, they are in a position to know it. It shows that this claim is not vulnerable to Gettier-style counterexamples and that it vindicates the idea that knowledge is a norm of belief, an idea supported by reflection on lottery cases and Moorean beliefs.

The Range of Reasons

This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person’s actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person’s beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against, possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle.

The Employment Relationship as an Object of Employment Law

This chapter addresses employment law. Employment law serves many purposes, but it is worth distinguishing between at least two types of purpose, public and private. First, employment law is a kind of economic policy that aims to regulate wage and employment levels, and to ensure public safety. Second, employment law governs a bilateral relationship between employer and employee. Within the second broad set of purposes—the “private” or “private law purposes”—one can make a further distinction. Some dimensions of employment law derive broadly from principles of contract while others derive, albeit less directly, from tort.Rights and restrictions derivative from contract realize or preserve free choice for employees and employers. These parts of employment law embody a first-order commitment to private ordering. Other doctrines in employment law place boundaries on private choice. One can understand many of these restrictions as ruling out or disfavoring certain interpersonal relationships because they are essentially disrespectful and incompatible with a collective understanding of human flourishing, in a manner reminiscent of tort. The chapter seeks to sort out the ways in which employment law promotes justice between employees and employers, even as it advances political justice writ large.