Levels of Being

2020 ◽  
pp. 6-37
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
Exclusion Problem

This chapter articulates an egalitarian ontology of levels of composition and realization that provides a foundation for the rest of the book. I reject the widespread assumption that levels form an ontological hierarchy such that some levels are more fundamental than others. On the contrary, neither wholes nor their proper parts are more fundamental; neither higher-level properties nor lower-level properties are more fundamental. Instead, higher levels are just invariant aspects of lower levels. Whole objects are invariants over additions, subtractions, and rearrangements of some parts; higher-level properties are invariant aspects of their lower-level realizers. This egalitarian ontology solves the causal exclusion problem and does justice to the special sciences—including cognitive neuroscience.

scholarly journals Double Prevention and Mental Causation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sean Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Exclusion Problem ◽  
Mental Events

<p>Double prevention is often mentioned in the causation literature but is not often discussed in depth. In this thesis my primary goal is to take a deep look at double prevention and evaluate one place it has been put to work. Briefly, a case of double prevention is a case where one event prevents another from preventing a third. While we have strong intuitions that such cases should be causally relevant at least, there is debate over whether they should be counted as fully causal. Sophie Gibb (2013) puts this concept to work by arguing that mental events act as double preventers to physical events. She frames this as an argument against the causal exclusion problem. I propose my own adaption of Gibb’s proposal which does not rest on the controversial premises the original does and as such has a wider appeal.</p>

Mereological Idealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Pearce
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Conceptual Schemes ◽  
Exclusion Problem

According to common sense, some but not all collections of objects are unified into larger wholes. For instance, a certain collection of pieces composes a person’s desk, but there is no object composed of that person’s left ear and the Eiffel Tower. Mereological idealism is the view that our conceptualizing activity is responsible for this unification: a collection of objects composes a whole if and only if those objects are co-apprehended by some mind under some concept. This chapter develops this view in detail and defends it against objections. Additionally, the chapter argues that mereological idealism is able to solve certain well-known problems faced by other theories of composition: the vagueness problem, the causal exclusion problem, and the problem of alternative conceptual schemes.

scholarly journals The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (8) ◽  
pp. 823
Author(s):  
Matthew Owen
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Efficacy ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Exclusion Problem ◽  
Pairing Problem ◽  
Causation Analysis ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

Mental causation is vitally important to the integrated information theory (IIT), which says consciousness exists since it is causally efficacious. While it might not be directly apparent, metaphysical commitments have consequential entailments concerning the causal efficacy of consciousness. Commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and the nature of causation determine which problem(s) a view of consciousness faces with respect to mental causation. Analysis of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind has brought several problems to the fore: the alleged lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem. This article surveys the threat each problem poses to IIT based on the different metaphysical commitments IIT theorists might make. Distinctions are made between what I call reductive IIT, non-reductive IIT, and non-physicalist IIT, each of which make differing metaphysical commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and nature of causation. Subsequently, each problem pertaining to mental causation is presented and its threat, or lack thereof, to each version of IIT is considered. While the lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening for all versions, reductive IIT and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining a commitment to the causal closure principle. Yet, non-physicalist IIT denies the principle but is therefore threatened by the pairing problem, to which I have elsewhere provided a response that is briefly outlined here. This problem also threatens non-reductive IIT, but unlike non-physicalist IIT it lacks an evident response. The ultimate aim of this survey is to provide a roadmap for IIT theorists through the maze of mental causation, by clarifying which commitments lead to which problems, and how they might or might not be overcome. Such a survey can aid IIT theorists as they further develop and hone the metaphysical commitments of IIT.

Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwayne Moore
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Behavioural Effect ◽  
Exclusion Problem

AbstractAccording to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem.

scholarly journals Double Prevention and Mental Causation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sean Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Exclusion Problem ◽  
Mental Events

<p>Double prevention is often mentioned in the causation literature but is not often discussed in depth. In this thesis my primary goal is to take a deep look at double prevention and evaluate one place it has been put to work. Briefly, a case of double prevention is a case where one event prevents another from preventing a third. While we have strong intuitions that such cases should be causally relevant at least, there is debate over whether they should be counted as fully causal. Sophie Gibb (2013) puts this concept to work by arguing that mental events act as double preventers to physical events. She frames this as an argument against the causal exclusion problem. I propose my own adaption of Gibb’s proposal which does not rest on the controversial premises the original does and as such has a wider appeal.</p>

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