Application of the Catecholaminergic Neuron Electron Transport (CNET) Physical Substrate for Consciousness and Action Selection to Integrated Information Theory

A newly discovered physical mechanism involving incoherent electron tunneling in layers of the protein ferritin that are found in catecholaminergic neurons (catecholaminergic neuron electron transport or CNET) is hypothesized to support communication between neurons. Recent tests further confirm that these ferritin layers can also perform a switching function (in addition to providing an electron tunneling mechanism) that could be associated with action selection in those neurons, consistent with earlier predictions based on CNET. While further testing would be needed to confirm the hypothesis that CNET allows groups of neurons to communicate and act as a switch for selecting one of the neurons in the group to assist in reaching action potential, this paper explains how that hypothesized behavior would be consistent with Integrated Information Theory (IIT), one of a number of consciousness theories (CTs). While the sheer number of CTs suggest that any one of them alone is not sufficient to explain consciousness, this paper demonstrates that CNET can provide a physical substrate and action selection mechanism that is consistent with IIT and which can also be applied to other CTs, such as to conform them into a single explanation of consciousness.

Ambiguous Body Ownership Experience Caused by Feeling–judgement Conflict: Evidence from Subjective Measurement in Rubber Hand Illusion using Integrated Information Theory

Human body awareness is malleable and adaptive to changing contexts. The illusory sense of body-ownership has been studied since the publication of the rubber hand illusion, where ambiguous body ownership feeling, expressed as "the dummy hand is my hand even though that is not true", was first defined. Phenomenologically, the ambiguous body ownership is attributed to a conflict between feeling and judgement; in other words, it characterises a discrepancy between first-person (i.e. bottom-up) and third-person (i.e. top-down) processes. Although Bayesian inference can explain this malleability of body image sufficiently, the theory does not provide a good illustration of why we have different experiences to the same stimuli -- the difficulty lies in the uncertainty regarding the concept of judgement in their theory. This study attempts to explain subjective experience during rubber hand illusions using integrated information theory (IIT). The integrated information Φ in IIT measures the difference between the entire system and its subsystems. This concept agrees with the phenomenological interpretation -- that is, there is conflict between judgement and feeling. By analysing the seven nodes of a small body--brain system, we demonstrate that the integrity of the entire system during the illusion decreases with increasing integrity of its subsystems. These general tendencies agree well with many brain-image analyses and subjective reports; furthermore, we found that subjective ratings were associated with the Φs. Our result suggests that IIT can explain the general tendency of the sense of ownership illusions and individual differences in subjective experience during the illusions.

How Morphological Computation Shapes Integrated Information in Embodied Agents

The Integrated Information Theory provides a quantitative approach to consciousness and can be applied to neural networks. An embodied agent controlled by such a network influences and is being influenced by its environment. This involves, on the one hand, morphological computation within goal directed action and, on the other hand, integrated information within the controller, the agent's brain. In this article, we combine different methods in order to examine the information flows among and within the body, the brain and the environment of an agent. This allows us to relate various information flows to each other. We test this framework in a simple experimental setup. There, we calculate the optimal policy for goal-directed behavior based on the “planning as inference” method, in which the information-geometric em-algorithm is used to optimize the likelihood of the goal. Morphological computation and integrated information are then calculated with respect to the optimal policies. Comparing the dynamics of these measures under changing morphological circumstances highlights the antagonistic relationship between these two concepts. The more morphological computation is involved, the less information integration within the brain is required. In order to determine the influence of the brain on the behavior of the agent it is necessary to additionally measure the information flow to and from the brain.

Apical Amplification – A Cellular Mechanism of Conscious Perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations fornetwork-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience.Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cellsare summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. Theseinputs come from diverse sources, and provide a context within which thetransmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal andperisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apicalamplification (AA) enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it moreflexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. AA providesa possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strongloops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspacetheories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of theindividual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms thatcontribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As AAis highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, itrelates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental statesand to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendritesprovide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selectiveamplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

Integrated Information Theory, Intrinsicality, and Overlapping Conscious Systems

Integrated information theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with having a maximum amount of integrated information. But a thing's having the maximum amount of anything cannot be intrinsic to it, for that depends on how that thing compares to certain other things. IIT's consciousness, then, is not intrinsic. A mereological argument elaborates this consequence: IIT implies that one physical system can be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not conscious. Thus, by a common and reasonable conception of intrinsicality, IIT's consciousness is not intrinsic. It is then argued that to avoid the implication that consciousness is not intrinsic, IIT must abandon its exclusion postulate, which prohibits overlapping conscious systems. Indeed, theories of consciousness that attribute consciousness to physical systems should embrace the view that some conscious systems overlap. A discussion of the admittedly counterintuitive nature of this solution, along with some medical and neuroscientific realities that would seem to support it, is included.

Filled/non-filled pairs: an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness

Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one’s visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with relatively high integrated information (Phi) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Phi.

Application of the Catecholaminergic Neuron Electron Transport (CNET) Physical Substrate for Consciousness and Action Selection to Integrated Information Theory

A newly-discovered physical mechanism involving electron tunneling in layers of the protein ferritin that are found in catecholaminergic neurons (catecholaminergic neuron electron transport or CNET), is hypothesized to support communication between neurons. Recent tests further confirm that these ferritin layers can also perform a switching function (in addition to providing an electron tunneling mechanism) that could be associated with action selection in those neurons, consistent with earlier predictions based on CNET. While further testing would be needed to confirm the hypothesis that CNET allows groups of neurons to communicate and act as a switch for selecting one of the neurons in the group to assist in reaching action potential, this paper explains how that hypothesized behavior would be consistent with Integrated Information Theory (IIT), one of a number of consciousness theories (CTs). While the sheer number of CTs suggest that any one of them is not sufficient to explain consciousness, this paper demonstrates that CNET can provide a physical substrate that is consistent with IIT and which can also be applied to other CTs, such as to conform them into a single explanation of consciousness.

The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. These include theories which explicitly point to EM fields, notably Operational Architectonics and, more recently, the General Resonance Theory. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness is a unified composition of contents. These contents are specific and meaningful, and they exist from a subjective point of view. Human conscious experience is temporally continuous, limited in content, and coherent. Based upon those phenomenal observations, pre-existing theories of consciousness, and a large body of experimental evidence, I derived the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). In brief, the TICL proposes that the neural correlate of consciousness is a structure of temporally integrated causality occurring over a large portion of the thalamocortical system. This structure is composed of a large, integrated set of neuronal elements (the System), which contains some subsystems, defined as having a higher level of temporally-integrated causality than the System as a whole. Each Subsystem exists from the point of view of the System, in the form of meaningful content. In this article, I review the TICL and consider the importance of EM forces as a mechanism of neural causality. I compare the fundamentals of TICL to those of several other neuroscientific theories. Using five major characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as a standard, I compare the basic tenets of Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace, General Resonance Theory, Operational Architectonics, and the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness with the framework of the TICL. While the literature concerned with these theories tends to focus on different lines of evidence, there are fundamental areas of agreement. This means that, in time, it may be possible for many of them to converge upon the truth. In this analysis, I conclude that a primary distinction which divides these theories is the feature of spatial and temporal nesting. Interestingly, this distinction does not separate along the fault line between theories explicitly concerned with EM fields and those which are not. I believe that reconciliation is possible, at least in principle, among those theories that recognize the following: just as the contents of consciousness are distinctions within consciousness, the neural correlates of conscious content should be distinguishable from but fall within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the full neural correlates of consciousness.

Apical amplification—a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.