scholarly journals New SPS Awards Board Chair and Editor-in-Chief Named for 2022 [Society News]

2022 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-15
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Nguyen Thi Kim Chi ◽  
Bui Van Can ◽  
Bui Minh Duc

Controlling the investment activities of company representatives helps to avoid inefficient investment activities. Shareholders will face with risks if manager’s decisions which not bring benefits to shareholders (according to agency theory). Studying the influence of corporate governance on investment has an important role in controlling investment activities of enterprises. Therefore, the authors analyze the impact of corporate governance on investment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam from 2014 to 2018. With data collected from 480 small and medium enterprises in Vietnam. The results show that state-owned enterprises tend to invest less than non-state enterprises. Companies with manager is board chair and manager hold shares will make investing more. Revenue growth and financial leverage have a positive impact on investment. From the results of this study, the authors also make some recommendations to help control investment activities in the enterprise through corporate governance characteristics.


Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.


2013 ◽  
pp. 268-291
Author(s):  
Abigail Levrau ◽  
Lutgart Van den Berghe
Keyword(s):  

The Analyst ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. ii-ii
Keyword(s):  

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