scholarly journals Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise

2016 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Arguments

scholarly journals Manipulation Arguments and the Standing to Blame

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt King
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Standing To Blame

The majority of recent work on the moral standing to blame (the idea that A may be unable to legitimately blame B despite B being blameworthy) has focused on blamers who themselves are blameworthy. This is unfortunate, for there is much to learn about the standing to blame once we consider a broader range of cases. Doing so reveals that challenged standing is more expansive than previously acknowledged, and accounts that have privileged the fact that the blamers are themselves morally culpable likely require revision. One such account figures in Patrick Todd’s (2012) argument for incompatibilism, which ostensibly depends on considerations involving the standing to blame. I believe this argument fails. But its failure is instructive, for it allows us to appreciate the numerous ways in which one’s blame can be morally problematic, and hence ways in which one’s standing to blame can be challenged. Thus, while one objective of this paper is to show why Todd’s argument fails, the larger aim is to use that argument to frame discussion of some important (and novel) ways in which the standing to blame can be compromised.

scholarly journals Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
TAYLOR W. CYR
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Theoretical Cost ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

AbstractIn response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular.

scholarly journals A new approach to manipulation arguments

2009 ◽  
Vol 152 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
New Approach ◽  
Manipulation Arguments

Compatibilism, Sourcehood, and Manipulation Arguments

Free Will ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 78-100
Author(s):  
Helen Beebee
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Arguments

Outsourcing the deep self: Deep self discordance does not explain away intuitions in manipulation arguments

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 637-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunnar Björnsson
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Arguments

Double Defence Against Multiple Case Manipulation Arguments

Philosophia ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 1283-1295
Author(s):  
Maria Sekatskaya
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Multiple Case

Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Manipulation Arguments

2018 ◽  
pp. 29-56
Author(s):  
John Lemos
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Arguments
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