scholarly journals Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
TAYLOR W. CYR
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Theoretical Cost ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

AbstractIn response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular.

scholarly journals “It was all a cruel angel’s thesis from the start”: Folk intuitions about Zygote cases do not support the Zygote argument

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Cova
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Zygote Argument ◽  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Folk Intuitions ◽  
Special Case ◽  
The Zygote Argument ◽  
Do So

Manipulation arguments that start from the intuition that manipulated agents are neither free nor morally responsible then conclude to that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The Zygote argument is a special case of Manipulation argument in which the manipulation intervenes at the very conception of the agent. In this paper, I argue that the Zygote argument fails because (i) very few people share the basic intuitions the argument rests on, and (ii) even those who share this intuition do so for reasons that are unrelated to determinism. Rather, I argue that intuitions about the Zygote argument (and Manipulation arguments in general) are driven by people's intuitions about the deep self, as shown by the fact that intuitions about manipulated agents depend on the moral value of the agent's behavior.

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.

A Minimal Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Unsolved Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Self ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

In this book Franklin develops and defends a version of event-causal libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility. This view is a combination of libertarianism—the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the upshots of nondeterministic causal processes—and agency reductionism—the view that the causal role of agents in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agents. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable and robust kind of freedom and responsibility. But Franklin argues that this is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains. Toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. If this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.

scholarly journals Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? A Critical Examination of Vargas’s Agency Cultivation Model of Responsibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-425
Author(s):  
Harry Harland
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Moral Influence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

Abstract This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral influence theory of responsibility (MIT) with his ‘agency cultivation model’ (ACM). By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinctive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Vargas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual test is epistemically redundant because it can only be fleshed out once we have settled the issues it is supposed to resolve. Moreover, it tacitly inverts the relation between freedom and responsibility—we cannot attribute free will to wrongdoers unless we have already established their blameworthiness. The upshot of this is that enquiries into an agent’s freedom are irrelevant to the ethics of holding her responsible.

scholarly journals Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.

scholarly journals Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.

scholarly journals The manipulation argument and Frankfurt-style compatibilism

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
Nedzib Prasevic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Tacit Assumptions ◽  
Intense Debate

In the metaphysics of free will, the most intense debate at this time is that between Frankfurt-style compatibilists and proponents of the manipulation argument centred around the appropriate answer to the question of whether a compatibilisticaly defined agents can be morally responsible if they are a victim of manipulation? In this paper, I aim to explain the reasons behind the dispute as well as bring attention to certain tacit assumptions that underpin the concept of the manipulation argument and that Frankfurt-style compatibilists need to reject. For this reason, my conclusions is that Frankfurt-style compatibilists must accept the counter-intuitive possibility that agents can have moral responsibility for their actions despite being a victim of manipulation.

Rationalizing: Kant on Moral Self-Deception

SATS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Noller
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Self ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Sensus Communis ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

Abstract Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”) helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” (sensus communis) in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing.

scholarly journals Understanding the Human Condition through the Depiction of Protagonists in Crime and Mystery Novels

MANUSYA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-105
Author(s):  
Kevalin Kaewruean
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
Authentic Existence ◽  
Mystery Novels ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility ◽  
The Human Condition

Abstract Extant criticism of crime and mystery fiction has indicated how protagonists have freedom of choice in dealing with difficult situations in different forms of risky or challenging settings. In this article, previous criticism is evaluated in terms of its reflection of an essential element of the human condition: the Self’s free will to construct the existential and spatial meanings of its phenomenological existence in relation to the Other. The article further indicates that protagonists tend to disregard their freedom and responsibility for their actions, especially when they make existential choices in traumatic or critical situations. Additionally, the dominance of others and variously suppressive spatial contexts can inhibit the protagonists from acknowledging their free will to act responsibly in order to reach their authentic existence. This article integrates Jean Paul Sartre’s concept of the human condition and the corresponding interpretative framework of spatial concepts from different thinkers, such as Edward Relph, Arnold van Gennep, Victor W. Turner and Mikhail M. Bakhtin, who emphasize the significance of places in the meaning-construction of the Self’s identity and its existence in relation to the Other. Through the integration of these theoretical frameworks, the portrayal of protagonists in contemporary crime and mystery novels is examined in order to illustrate individuals’ senses of freedom and responsibility for their own actions in existential and spatial contexts.

Exceptionality Effect in Agency: Exceptional Choices Attributed Higher Free Will Than Routine

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
adrien Alejandro fillon ◽  
Anthony Lantian ◽  
Gilad Feldman ◽  
Ahogni Ngbala
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Negative Outcomes ◽  
Subject Design ◽  
Consistent Support ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

Exceptionality effect is the widely cited phenomenon that people experience stronger regret for negative outcomes that are a result of more exceptional circumstances, compared to routine. We hypothesize that the exceptionality-routine attribution asymmetry would extend to attributions of freedom and responsibility. In Experiment 1 (N = 338), we found that people attributed more free will to an exceptional behavior compared to a routine one, when the exception was due to self-choice rather than external circumstances. In Experiment 2 (N = 561), we replicated and generalized the effect of exceptionality on attributions of free will to other scenarios, with support for the classic exceptionality effect regarding regret and an extension to moral responsibility. In Experiment 3 (N = 128), we replicated these effects in a within-subject design. When using a classic experimental philosophy paradigm contrasting a deterministic and an indeterministic universe, we found that the results were robust across both contexts. We conclude that there is a consistent support for a link between exceptionality and free will attributions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document