Which Reason? Which Rationality?

The slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons has a turbulent history: once taken for granted; then widely rejected; now enjoying a resurgence. The slogan is made harder to assess by an ever-increasing plethora of distinctions pertaining to reasons and rationality. Here we are occupied with two such distinctions: that between subjective and objective reasons, and that between structural rationality (a.k.a. coherence) and substantive rationality (a.k.a. reasonableness). Our paper has two main aims. The first is to defend dualism about rationality—the view that affirms a deep distinction between structural and substantive rationality—against its monistic competitors. The second aim is to answer the question: with the two distinctions drawn, what becomes of the slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons? We’ll argue that structural rationality cannot be identified with responsiveness to any kind of reasons. As for substantive rationality, we join others in thinking that the most promising reasons-responsiveness account of substantive rationality will involve an “evidence-relative” understanding of reasons. But we also pose a challenge for making this idea precise—a challenge that ultimately calls into question the fundamentality of the notion of a reason even with respect to the analysis of substantive rationality.

The Fair Opportunity Conception of Responsibility

The fair opportunity conception of responsibility is articulated and defended by appeal to common assumptions about the nature of excuses. Fair opportunity requires agential capacities and opportunities in the form of normative competence and situational control. The cognitive and volitional capacities constitutive of normative competence require reasons-responsiveness, which comes in degrees. The person is the locus of responsibility

The paradox of unconventional affordances

Responsiveness to affordances that are salient in our conventional practices is usually automatic and unreflective—for good reasons. Responsiveness to unconventional affordances, by contrast, must be enforced. This is what artistic interventions of studio RAAAF do. I argue that it is precisely the fact that affordances are more or less forced on us that makes it possible for us to relate to them freely.

Autonomy

This chapter explains three conceptions of personal autonomy through a discussion of two teen girls’ struggles for self-definition. Autonomy is the ability to live a life that is genuinely one’s own. Starr, the protagonist of Angie Thomas’s The Hate You Give, struggles to know herself because the demands of upward mobility seem to ask her to disavow her Blackness. Kiara, the author of a blog post on oppressive beauty standards, struggles to find self-worth in a society that devalues the way she looks. The chapter discusses how coherentist, reasons-responsiveness, and socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy illuminate the girls’ lives. It also explains why autonomy should not be conceived of as the rejection of all social influence.

The Trouble with Formal Views of Autonomy

Formal views of autonomy rule out substantive rational capacities (reasons-responsiveness) as a condition of autonomous agency. I argue that such views face a number of underappreciated problems: they have trouble making sense of how autonomous agents could be robustly responsible for their choices, face the burden of explaining why there should be a stark distinction between the importance of factual and evaluative information within autonomous agency, and leave it mysterious why autonomy is the sort of thing that has value and ought to be promoted. Moreover, I argue that the alternative view that includes substantive rational capacities need not have the unacceptable political implications it is sometimes thought to have.

Responsibility

Responsibility admits of degrees, and Scrupulosity seems to diminish responsibility for harms caused to some degree. We focus on whether Scrupulosity provides an excuse that reduces or removes moral liability responsibility for bad actions or consequences. More precisely, we distinguish attributability, answerability, and accountability responsibility. Our question is whether someone with Scrupulosity is accountability responsible—whether it is fitting to feel anger, resentment, or indignation toward them—for harms they cause. We consider two compatibilist theories of responsibility: deep-self theories and reasons-responsiveness theories. Unlike deep-self theories, reasons-responsiveness theories can distinguish scrupulous actions by distinguishing responding to reasons from responding to anxiety. Finally, we address whether present responsibility can be traced to one’s previous bad decisions and cases in which one was clearly responsible.

Clean Hands

Scrupulosity is a form of OCD that raises philosophical puzzles because of its superficial similarities to morally extreme, non-pathological motivation. Cases of Scrupulosity are first presented, then Scrupulosity is characterized as a form of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) because of its moral or religious obsessions and/or compulsions and its underlying anxiety. Scrupulosity is specifically characterized by perfectionism, chronic doubt and intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. It is a mental illness and not simply religious devotion, moral virtue, or strength of character. Scrupulous moral judgments differ from genuine moral judgments because their underlying anxiety leads to systematic distortions and leads those with Scrupulosity to act in a way that primarily soothes their anxiety instead of responding to the morally relevant features of the situation. People with Scrupulosity are likely less accountable for harms they cause, which can be explained by reasons-responsiveness theories of responsibility. There is justification for treating Scrupulosity over moral objection without imposing the therapist’s own moral standards.

Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence

We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as ‘gullible’ or ‘biased’, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief’s reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart’s influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart’s. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart’s account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others’ interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELF-DECEPTION

In this paper, I argue that Alfred Mele’s conception of self-deception is such that it always fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. This is because self-deceptive mechanisms of belief formation are such that the kind of beliefs they bring about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for doxastic responsibility from epistemic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele describes the relation of the subject to the evidence as a biased relation. The subject does not simply believe on the basis of evidence, but on the basis of manipulated evidence. Mele puts forward four ways in which the subject does this. The subject could misinterpret positively or negatively, selectively focus, or gather evidence. Through these ways of manipulation, the evidence is framed such that the final product constitutes evidence on the basis of which the subject may believe a proposition that fits that subject’s desire that P. Whichever form of manipulation the subject uses, the evidence against P must be neutralized in one way or another. Successful neutralization of the evidence requires the ability to recognize what the evidence supports and the ability to react to it. These abilities consist precisely in the two parts of the reasons-responsiveness condition, reasons receptivity and reasons reactivity. In that sense, self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. However, given that reasons responsiveness is only a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility, this does not mean that self-deceived subjects are always responsible for their belief.