Location choices and third-degree spatial price discrimination

2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-153
Author(s):  
Hong Feng ◽  
Jie Ma
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Heywood ◽  
Zheng Wang

Abstract We present the first demonstration of the influence of a quality rivalry on location choices under spatial price discrimination. The rivalry is shown to generate the socially efficient quality but to push locations inefficiently close together, a result not found under Hotelling pricing. We apply this new equilibrium to the anti-trust policy issue of collusion showing that introducing the quality rivalry reduces the likelihood of collusion.


1985 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 167 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. L. Greenhut ◽  
H. Ohta ◽  
Joel Sailors

Economica ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 42 (168) ◽  
pp. 401 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Greenhut ◽  
M. L. Greenhut

1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iñaki Aguirre ◽  
Marı́a Paz Espinosa ◽  
Inés Macho-Stadler

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