THE SHAPLEY VALUE, THE OWEN VALUE, AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ CASAJUS
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Banzhaf Value ◽  
Owen Value ◽  
Symmetric Distributions ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Cooperation Structure

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property.

scholarly journals Some Recursive Definitions for Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games

Game Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irinel Dragan
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Banzhaf Value ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Tu Games ◽  
Power Game ◽  
Recursive Definitions

We give recursive definitions for the Banzhaf Value and the Semivalues of cooperative TU games. These definitions were suggested by the concept of potential for the Shapley Value due to Hart and Mas-Colell and by some results of the author who introduced the potentials of these values and the Power Game of a given game.

On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value

2013 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Radzik ◽  
Theo Driessen
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value

Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van den Brink ◽  
Gerard van der Laan
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Banzhaf Value ◽  
The Shapley Value

A Note on the Owen Value for Glove Games

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Belau
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Computational Effort ◽  
Computationally Efficient ◽  
Owen Value ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Minimal Winning Coalitions

A well-known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the component restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield different distributions of worth. While the Shapley value does not distinguish between productive and unproductive agents in the market and the component restricted Shapley value does not consider imbalancedness of the market, the Owen value accounts for both. As computational effort for Shapley-based allocation rules is generally high, this note provides a computationally efficient formula for the Owen value (and the component restricted Shapley value) for glove games in case of minimal winning coalitions. A comparison of the efficient formulas highlights the above-mentioned differences.

scholarly journals THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIM HANG PHAM DO ◽  
HENK NORDE
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Partition Function Form Games ◽  
Partition Function Form

Different axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU games can be found in the literature. The Shapley value has been generalized in several ways to the class of games in partition function form. In this paper we discuss another generalization of the Shapley value and provide a characterization.

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