Redistribution of tax resources: a cooperative game theory approach

We consider the problem of how to distribute public expenditure among the different regions of an economic entity after all taxes have been collected. Typical examples are: the regions that make up a country, the states of a federal country, or the countries of a confederation of countries. We model the problem as a cooperative game in coalitional form, called the tax game. This game estimates the fiscal resources collected in each region, or coalition of regions, by differentiating between what comes from economic activity within each region and what comes from trade with the other regions. This methodology provides a measure of the disagreement within a region, or coalitions of regions, with respect to the budget received. Similarly, the stability of a budget allocation can be inferred by its situation within the core of the corresponding tax game. We consider the Spanish case as an example and show that the current regional financial system has a moderate degree of instability. We introduce two budget allocation rules, both borrowed from the cooperative games literature: the balanced allocation, which coincides with the nucleolus and with the Shapley value of the tax game, and the weighted balanced allocation, which coincides with the weighted Shapley value. We compare both budget allocation rules with the current Spanish financial system.

Axiomatic and Dynamic Processes for a Symmetric Allocation Rule

It has recently become imperative to analyze relevant issues to improve the efficiency of resource allocation by means of different perspectives and ways of thinking. There exist numerous decisive factors, such as changes in forms of allocation, reactive behavior, and the interaction and functional effectiveness of strategies, that need to be complied. In contrast to expert meetings, rules of thumb, or other existing concepts, this article aims to offer a different and efficient resource allocation approach by applying game-theoretical methods to resource-allocation situations. Our major investigative procedures are as follows: (1) after comparing our method with pre-existing allocation rules from pre-existing allocation rules, a symmetric allocation rule is proposed that considers both units and their energy grades; (2) based on the properties of grade completeness, criterion for models, unmixed equality symmetry, grade synchronization, and consistency, some axiomatic outcomes are used to examine the mathematical accuracy and the applied rationality of this symmetric allocation rule; (3) based on a symmetrical revising function, a dynamic process is applied to show that this symmetric allocation rule can be reached by units that start from an arbitrary grade completeness situation; and (4) these axiomatic and dynamic results and related meanings are applied to show that this symmetric allocation rule can present an optimal alternative guide for resource-allocation processes. Related applications, comparisons, and statements are also offered throughout this article.

Relative Entropy in Determining Degressive Proportional Allocations

The principle of degressively proportional apportionment of goods, being a compromise between equality and proportionality, facilitates the application of many different allocation rules. Agents with smaller entitlements are more interested in an allocation that is as close to equality as possible, while those with greater entitlements prefer an allocation as close to proportionality as possible. Using relative entropy to quantify the inequity of allocation, this paper indicates an allocation that neutralizes these two contradictory approaches by symmetrizing the inequities perceived by the smallest and largest agents participating in the apportionment. First, based on some selected properties, the set of potential allocation rules was reduced to those generated by power functions. Then, the existence of the power function whose exponent is determined so as to generate the allocation that symmetrizes the relative entropy with respect to equal and proportional allocations was shown. As a result, all agents of the apportionment are more inclined to accept the proposed allocation regardless of the size of their entitlements. The exponent found in this way shows the significant relationship between the problem under study and the well-known Theil indices of inequality. The problem may also be seen from this viewpoint.

The “Economic Battle” Now and Then: (E)valuation Patterns of Distributive Justice in Cuban State-Socialism

This article disentangles and explores some commonly made assumptions about egalitarian state-socialist ideologies. Based on the conceptual framework of the multiprinciple approach of justice, it presents the results of an in-depth analysis of (e)valuation patterns of distributive justice in Cuban state-socialism. The analysis mainly focuses on ideational conceptions of distributive justice (just rewards), but it also accounts for distribution outcomes and resulting (in)equalities (actual rewards). The results of the comparative case study of the Cuban framework of institutions and political leaders’ views in two periods of time, the early 1960s and the 2010s, point to (e)valuation patterns that are generally labelled as egalitarian, such as the allocation rules of outcome equality and (non-functional) needs. However, contrary to common assumptions about egalitarian state-socialist ideologies, the results also point to several other patterns, including equity rules as well as functional and productivist allocation rules. I argue that many of these (e)valuation patterns, in their connection to the discursive storyline of the Cuban economic battle, are indeed compatible with egalitarian state-socialist ideology.

15. Track Allocation and Case Management

Judicial case management of civil litigation is one of the central planks of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR). In exercising their powers to manage cases, the courts will be seeking to secure the overriding objective of the CPR of ensuring that cases are dealt with justly and at proportionate cost. This chapter discusses procedural judges; docketing; provisional track allocation; filing directions questionnaires; track allocation rules; notice of allocation; allocation directions; ADR and stays to allow for settlement; transfer to appropriate court; trial in the Royal Courts of Justice; changing tracks; and subsequent case management.