Map is Not Territory, Menu is Not Meal

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-13
Author(s):  
Nancy Frankenberry
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Definition Of Religion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Radical Relativism

Abstract This article focuses on Jonathan Z. Smith’s 1978 essay, “Map is Not Territory,” in terms of its definition of religion, allegiance to anthropology and history, and avoidance of relativism. Updated to the author’s situation forty years later, it articulates the relation between map and territory as one of asymmetrical dependence governed by the rule that the concrete includes the abstract and exceeds it in value. Reading Smith’s essay in light of Donald Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” provides a philosophical argument against radical relativism. Two brief aperçu about Smith frame this account.

Agama Hindu Dharma Indonesia as a New Religious Movement: Hinduism Recreated in the Image of Islam

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
June McDaniel
Keyword(s):  
Civil Religion ◽  
Religious Studies ◽  
Religious Movement ◽  
Ancient Religion ◽  
Definition Of Religion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Universal Ethic

This article describes the role of Hinduism in modern Indonesia and the ways in which it has been adapted to fit the government's definition of religion as a prophetic monotheism with revealed texts and a universal ethic. It gives a brief background on Indonesian history and analyzes the structure and theology of Agama Hindu Dharma Indonesia. It discusses whether a governmental reorganization of an ancient religion can be considered a new religious movement, and some approaches that might be useful from the field of religious studies. It suggests that the definition of new religious movement be changed to fit the case in which a modern religion considered to be a revealed religion also acts as a civil religion.

On the Indispensability of Intentionality

1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-133
Author(s):  
Harold Morick
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Essential Property ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

In the last two decades, there has been a great deal of interest in providing an intentional criterion of the psychological. Of the various ones proferred, it seems to me that the best was the earliest, which was Chisholm’s initial criterion in his 1955 essay “Sentences about Believing.” In this present paper I first single out a basic misconception pervading the recent literature on intentionality and suggest that a consequence of this misconception has been the futile attempt to use the notion of intentionality to provide a kind of definition of “mind”; that is, to use intentionality to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the psychological. Secondly, I point out how intentionality as captured by my own criterion is indispensable in that it is an essential property of certain particulars (persons) which are basic to our conceptual scheme and apparently basic to any conceptual scheme whatsoever.

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