scholarly journals Optimal Voting Rules

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peyton Young

Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters’ opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.

2015 ◽  
pp. 108-138
Author(s):  
Andrew Hindmoor ◽  
Brad Taylor

Author(s):  
Kenneth Arrow ◽  
Amartya Sen ◽  
Kotaro Suzumura

2004 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 619-631
Author(s):  
SHANFENG ZHU ◽  
QIZHI FANG ◽  
WEIMIN ZHENG

Social choice theory is the study of decision theory on how to aggregate separate preferences into group's rational preference. It has wide applications, especially on the design of voting rules, and brings far-reaching influence on the development of modern political science and welfare economics. With the advent of the information age, social choice theory finds its up-to-date application on designing effective Metasearch engines. Metasearch engines provide effective searching by combining the results of multiple source search engines that make use of diverse models and techniques. In this work, we analyze social choice algorithms in a graph-theoretic approach. In addition to classical social choice algorithms, such as Borda and Condorcet, we study one special type of social choice algorithms, elimination voting, to tackle Metasearch problem. Some new algorithms are proposed and examined in the fusion experiment on TREC data. It shows that these elimination voting algorithms achieve satisfied performance when compared with Borda algorithm.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 34
Author(s):  
Aki Lehtinen

This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining a realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow's theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for democracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable.


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