Optimal Voting Rules
1995 ◽
Vol 9
(1)
◽
pp. 51-64
◽
Keyword(s):
Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters’ opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.
2011 ◽
pp. 3-27
◽
2015 ◽
Vol 4
(1)
◽
pp. 177
2004 ◽
Vol 03
(04)
◽
pp. 619-631
1973 ◽
Vol 1
(6)
◽
pp. 567-568