Social Contract, Extended Goodness, and Moral Disagreement

This article discusses the role played by interpersonal comparisons (of utility or goodness) in matters of justice and equity. The role of such interpersonal comparisons has initially been made explicit in the context of social choice theory through the concept of extended preferences. Social choice theorists have generally claimed that extended preferences should be taken as being uniform across a population. Three related claims are made within this perspective. First, though it is sometimes opposed to social choice theory, the social contract approach may also consider the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. This is due to the fact that justice principles may be partially justified on a teleological basis. Second, searching for the uniformity of interpersonal comparisons is both hopeless and useless. In particular, moral disagreement does not originate in the absence of such uniformity. Third, interpersonal comparisons should be accounted for both in social choice and social contract theories in terms of sympathetic identification based on reciprocal respect and tolerance, where each person’s conception of the good partially takes care of others’ good. From the moral point of view, any person’s conception of the good should thus be ‘extended’ to others’ personal conceptions. This extension is, however, limited due to the inherent limitations in sympathetic identification and is a long way from guaranteeing the uniformity assumed by social choice theorists.

Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being

In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being must turn from a preference-satisfaction to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being in order to avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but object that no version of the desire-satisfaction theory can provide a plausible account of how an individual's degree of well-being depends on the satisfaction or frustration of their various desires, at least in cases involving the gain or loss of desires. So subjectivists can avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons only by adopting a substantively implausible view. In this reply, I defend subjectivism by arguing that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids Van der Deijl and Brouwer's objections, and briefly suggest that it may also be able to handle the problem of adaptive desires. I conclude that subjectivists should endorse the totalist desire-satisfaction theory.

Happiness, Competition, and Not Necessarily Arrogance in Kant

Kant held that human beings are competitive and not very good at living together in harmony. He also held that the principle of one’s own happiness is the central opponent of the principle of morality. According to Allen Wood, these claims are related: the competitive tendencies Kant attributes to human nature reveal, according to Wood, that the very shape of our human idea of happiness is derived from a deep-seated arrogance, incompatible with morality. I argue, by contrast, that although Kant’s discussion of human nature reveals that human happiness is complicated by interpersonal comparisons and tensions, these are not immoral (or derived from immorality) and require no claims of innate human arrogance for their explanation. Consequently, these aspects of human nature are not themselves the reason that Kant considers our desire for happiness to be in conflict with our morality.

LIBERTARIAN PHILOSOPHY VERSUS PROPERTARIAN DOGMA: A FURTHER REPLY TO BLOCK

This replies to Block 2019 (B19), which responds to Lester 2014 (L14). The main issues in the, varyingly sized, sections are as follows. 1 Further explanations of critical rationalism, the theory of liberty, and problems with the non-aggression principle. 2.1 The relationships among law, morality, and libertarianism. 2.2 The objective invasiveness of low-level radiation and that it is, therefore, a proactive imposition (albeit trivial) if someone inflicts it on non-consenting people. 2.3 The objective and subjective aspects of proactive impositions; and how clashes can be resolved. 2.4 How liberty relates to risk and self-ownership. 2.5 Libertarian initial acquisition versus absolute property rights by labour-mixing. 2.6 Organisational note. 2.7 Libertarianism and mens rea. 2.8 Libertarian rectification versus lex-talionis doubling. 2.9 Indirectly clashing rights, self-preservation, trespasser-hiker, flagpole-grasper, and landmine-layer. 2.10 A logical point is not a moral point. 2.11 Pacifism and libertarianism. 3.1 A weak criticism of utilitarianism. 3.2 Hedonometers; approximate interpersonal comparisons of utility imply libertarianism; what a libertarian is; libertarian rankings. 4. Libertarian philosophy versus propertarian dogma. Coda: the need to take seriously the philosophical problems with propertarian-justificationist libertarianism. Readers that might be interested include those engaging in libertarian philosophy and those using the Rothbardian/Blockian theoretical approach to libertarianism.

Where Do We Stand?

What is Utilitarianism? The answer is not obvious, and without and answer much that has been written about Utilitarianism is not meaningful. But measurement of hedonic value of episodes on a ratio scale opens up possibilities various kinds of product utilitarianism without interpersonal comparisons. And equilibration dynamics opens up the possibility of conventional interpersonal comparisons, and the use of the Utilitarian sum.

Dynamics of Convention

Interpersonal comparisons of utility can be conventional. Alternative conventions are possible. The (conventional) aggregate utility can be used for equilibrium selection. This solves the old Utilitarian problem of conflict between maximizing individual and group utility. Conditions on an equilibration dynamics leading to such a convention are given.

Product Utilitarianism and an Old-New Way to Measure Utility

A theory of hedonic episodes is given. A representation theorem is given, which measures utility on a ratio scale.For aggregation of pleasures for a group, the product of individual utilities is meaningful without interpersonal comparisons. Common “counterexamples” to Utilitarianism turn out not to be meaningful. There are two distinct kinds of group expected utility: one violates group rationality, the other violates Pareto dominance.