Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer
2008 ◽
Vol 38
(3)
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pp. 343-371
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There is one important point about which Fischer and I are in agreement. We agree that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. We disagree about the best way of defending that claim. He thinks that Frankfurt's strategy is a good one, that we can grant incompatibilists the metaphysical victory (that is, agree with them that determinism means that we are never able to do otherwise) while insisting that we are still morally responsible. I think this a huge mistake and I think the literature spawned by Frankfurt's attempt to undercut the metaphysical debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists is a snare and a delusion, distracting our attention from the important issues.
2005 ◽
Vol 30
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pp. 303-319
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Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 172
(8)
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pp. 2091-2107
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