Defending an Ability Analysis of Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-170
Author(s):  
Ann Whittle
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Previous Discussion ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

In this chapter, a defence of the ability analysis of control proposed in chapter six is offered. The chapter begins by outlining some advantages of the analysis; briefly, not only does it explain the deep connection that appears to exist between freedom, moral responsibility, and the ability to do otherwise, it captures our judgements regarding moral responsibility in a wide range of tricky cases. The chapter then examines how to understand the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause in the ability analysis of control, and defends the proposed asymmetry between praise and blameworthy actions. By so doing, the chapter also ties the previous discussion of control more overtly to issues regarding moral responsibility.

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
New Orleans ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Standing To Blame

This is the sixth volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. The papers were drawn from the fourth biennial New Orleans Workshop in Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR), held November 2–4, 2017. The essays cover a wide range of topics relevant to agency and responsibility: the threat of neuroscience to free will; the relevance of resentment and guilt to responsibility; how control and self-control pertain to moral agency, oppression, and poverty; responsibility for joint agency; the role and conditions of shame in theories of attributability; how one might take responsibility without blameworthy quality of will; what it means to have standing to blame others; the relevance of moral testimony to moral responsibility; how to build a theory of attributabiity that captures all the relevant cases; and how thinking about blame better enables us to dissolve a dispute in moral philosophy between actualists and possibilists.

The Inclusion and Design of Cultural Differences in Interactive Multimedia Environments

2019 ◽  
pp. 532-556
Author(s):  
Vehbi Turel ◽  
Eylem Kılıç
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Interactive Multimedia ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
Design And Development ◽  
Learning Materials ◽  
Development Stages ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Multimedia Environments

A concern for social justice and the inclusion of cultural differences as a requirement of social justice in all learning materials, whether they are in the form of conventional materials or Interactive Multimedia Environments (IMEs), is the moral responsibility of all educators who want to contribute to humanity as well as long-lasting peace in our world. Such a responsibility requires a wide range of philosophical, political, and sociological discourses, informing multiple debates and their implications in the field of education. As a requirement of this, in this chapter, the inclusion and design of cultural differences in IMEs are focused on. The design and development stages of IMEs are categorized into six separate stages: (1) feasibility, (2) setting up a team of experts, (3) designing, (4) programming, (5) testing, and (6) evaluating (Turel & McKenna, 2013, pp. 188-190). Each stage is vital to the design and development process for cost effective and socially just IMEs. To be able to achieve cost effective and genuinely socially inclusive IMEs, a wide range of principles and guidelines need to be borne in mind at each stage. Here, the inclusion and design in IMEs of the cultural differences that need to be considered while designing and developing such environments (i.e. at stage 3 as well as 4) are focused on. Some examples of thought out and customized computerised cultural differences from an IME as well as some concrete examples from the Turkish context are given.

scholarly journals Determinants and Values of Willingness to Pay for Water Quality Improvement: Insights from Chia Lagoon, Malawi

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodgers Makwinja ◽  
Ishmael Bobby Mphangwe Kosamu ◽  
Chikumbusko Chiziwa Kaonga
Keyword(s):  
Water Quality ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Civic Education ◽  
Water Source ◽  
Natural Ecosystems ◽  
Group Discussions ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Holistic Approaches ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Baseline Information

Water resources in the Chia lagoon in Malawi experience a possible threat to sustainability. Communities are seeking alternatives to improve water quality in the lagoon. This study quantified the communities’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) and their influencing factors while using contingent valuation (CV) techniques. A wide range of data collection procedures, including focus group discussions, key informant interviews, field observation, and CV survey, were employed. A sample of 300 households was randomly selected. The CV results showed that 57.4% of the households were willing to pay. The monthly individual aggregate WTP amount ranged from MK696.83 (US$0.95) to MK81697 (US$111.38), and on average MK7870.45 (US$10.73), generating aggregate annual values ranging from MK6, 689,568 (US$9126.29) to MK784, 294,080 (US$1,069,978), and on average MK75,556,320 (US$103,078) (ceteris paribus). Logistic regression model demonstrated a significant (p < 0.01 or p < 0.05) relationship between demographic (gender, age, literacy level), social-economic (land ownership, main agriculture water source, and income), and institutional (civic education and social network, extension, institutional trust, household socio trust) factors and WTP. The findings from this study provide significant clues for further research and baseline information for local government and communities in the development of more effective and holistic approaches for improving water quality in natural ecosystems.

Free Will

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Timpe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Past ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of

Free will is a perennial issue in philosophy, both in terms of the history of philosophy and in contemporary discussions. Aspects of free will relate to a wide range of philosophical issues, but especially to metaphysics and ethics. For roughly the past three decades, the literatures on free will and moral responsibility have overlapped to such a degree that it is impossible to separate them. This entry focuses on contemporary discussions about the nature and existence of free will, as well as its relationship to work in the sciences and philosophy of religion.

Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kadri Vihvelin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

There is one important point about which Fischer and I are in agreement. We agree that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. We disagree about the best way of defending that claim. He thinks that Frankfurt's strategy is a good one, that we can grant incompatibilists the metaphysical victory (that is, agree with them that determinism means that we are never able to do otherwise) while insisting that we are still morally responsible. I think this a huge mistake and I think the literature spawned by Frankfurt's attempt to undercut the metaphysical debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists is a snare and a delusion, distracting our attention from the important issues.

scholarly journals Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Mercier ◽  
Dan Sperber
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Psychology Of Reasoning ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Erroneous Beliefs ◽  
Reasoning Tasks

AbstractReasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.

scholarly journals Folk Intuitions and the Conditional Ability to Do Otherwise

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Siyuan Yin ◽  
Rose Graves
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
First Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Folk Intuitions ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

In a series of three pre-registered studies, we explored (a) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about deterministic scenarios, (b) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about neurodeterministic scenarios (that is, scenarios where the determinism is described at the neurological level), (c) the difference between people’s intuitions about neutral scenarios (e.g., walking a dog in the park) and their intuitions about negatively valenced scenarios (e.g., murdering a stranger), and (d) the difference between people’s intuitions about free will and responsibility in response to first-person scenarios and third-person scenarios. We predicted that once we focused participants’ attention on the two different abilities to do otherwise available to agents in indeterministic and deterministic scenarios, their intuitions would support natural incompatibilism—the view that laypersons judge that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. This prediction was borne out by our findings.

Introduction to OSAR 6

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
David Shoemaker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
New Orleans ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Standing To Blame

This introduction to the sixth volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility briefly discusses each of the new essays being published. They were drawn from the fourth biennial New Orleans Workshop in Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR), held November 2–4, 2017. The essays cover a wide range of topics relevant to agency and responsibility: the threat of neuroscience to free will; the relevance of moral emotions like shame, resentment, and guilt to responsibility; how control and self-control pertain to moral agency, oppression, and poverty; responsibility for joint agency; how one might take responsibility without blameworthy quality of will; what it means to have standing to blame others; the relevance of moral testimony to moral responsibility; and how thinking about blame better enables us to dissolve a dispute in moral philosophy between actualists and possibilists.

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