Value Pluralism: Crucial Complexities

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-336
Author(s):  
George Crowder

Abstract Discussing the crucifix case, Beata Polanowska-Sygulska concludes that the decision on appeal fits with Berlinian value pluralism, while the initial judgement was ethically monist. Her assumption is that pluralism favours cultural diversity against uniform law. This assumption is too simple and needs to be qualified by several considerations. First, we should be clear that, under pluralism, a moral question may have ‘one right answer’ if this is contextual. Second, so far as pluralism connects with cultural diversity, this has multiple dimensions, applying not just among societies but within them as well. Third, pluralists ought to be concerned primarily with promoting a diversity of values rather than cultures. When these matters are properly taken into account, it can be seen that a uniform law may be more pluralist than a multiplicity of local laws, depending on the circumstances.

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-254
Author(s):  
Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

AbstractGeorge Crowder’s article makes an interesting contribution to the literature on value pluralism. Yet, as a commentary onmy essay (Polanowska-Sygulska, 2019c) it is entirely misconceived. Crowder’s reading of my text is inadequate, in terms of both the legal and the philosophical aspects of my argument. Having ascribed to me the belief that pluralism always favors cultural diversity against legal uniformity (a belief which I do nothold), he argues that a single uniform law may engender more value diversity than a multiplicity of local legal systems. This may indeed be so, but it is notmy concern. What Isaiah Berlin aimed at more than anything else was to bring about a decent society, which at times requires the pursuit of other values to be limited. I share his approach and therefore argue that, for the sake of decency, both value diversity and cultural diversity may sometimes need to be restricted.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 350-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Ricaurte

Data assemblages amplify historical forms of colonization through a complex arrangement of practices, materialities, territories, bodies, and subjectivities. Data-centric epistemologies should be understood as an expression of the coloniality of power manifested as the violent imposition of ways of being, thinking, and feeling that leads to the expulsion of human beings from the social order, denies the existence of alternative worlds and epistemologies, and threatens life on Earth. This article develops a theoretical model to analyze the coloniality of power through data and explores the multiple dimensions of coloniality as a framework for identifying ways of resisting data colonization. Finally, this article suggests possible alternative data epistemologies that are respectful of populations, cultural diversity, and environments.


1984 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 320-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Irving ◽  
Harold Perl ◽  
Edison J. Trickett ◽  
Rod Watts
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document