On Credit Frictions as Labor-Income Taxation

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salem M. Abo-Zaid
2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 2845-2891
Author(s):  
Salem Abo-Zaid

This paper studies optimal labor-income taxation in a simple model with credit constraints on firms. The labor-income tax rate and the shadow value on the credit constraint induce a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. It is found that optimal policy prescribes a volatile path for the labor-income tax rate even in the presence of state-contingent debt and capital. In this respect, credit frictions are akin to a form of market incompleteness. Credit frictions break the equivalence between tax smoothing and wedge smoothing; therefore, as the tightness of the credit constraint varies over the business cycle, tax volatility is needed in order to counter this variation and, as a result, allow for wedge smoothing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 88-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hunt Allcott ◽  
Benjamin Lockwood ◽  
Dmitry Taubinsky

An influential result in modern optimal tax theory, the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem, holds that for a broad class of utility functions, all redistribution should be carried out through labor income taxation, rather than differential taxes on commodities or capital. An important requirement for that result is that commodity taxes are known and fully salient when consumers make income-determining choices. This paper allows for the possibility consumers may be inattentive to (or unaware of) some commodity taxes when making choices about income. We show that commodity taxes are useful for redistribution in this setting. In fact, the optimal commodity taxes essentially follow the classic “many person Ramsey rule” (Diamond 1975), scaled by the degree of inattention. As a result, to the extent that commodity taxes are not (fully) salient, goods should be taxed when they are less elastically consumed, and when they are consumed primarily by richer consumers. We extend this result to the setting of corrective taxes, and show how non-salient corrective taxes should be adjusted for distributional reasons.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunnar Du Rietz ◽  
Dan Johansson ◽  
Mikael Stenkula

2015 ◽  
pp. 35-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunnar Du Rietz ◽  
Dan Johansson ◽  
Mikael Stenkula

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